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Abstract
In the German railway domain, computer-based interlocking system requirements
specifications are written in natural language. It is well-known that natural lan-
guage written specifications are easily misinterpreted because of their possible
unclearness and ambiguity. Furthermore, checking the correctness of these speci-
fications is difficult. Imprecise and incorrect system requirements can reduce the
efficiency of a system development process. They might also lead to errors in the
system. The costs of amending these errors become higher as the development
process proceeds. For safety critical systems like interlocking systems, the high-
est costs are then the loss of human life. Using formal methods to specify these
system requirements in the early stage of a development process is the proposed
solution to solve the above stated problems. Because of the advantages of apply-
ing and the suggestions from CENELEC to use formal methods for railway system
development, a number of research projects in this topic have been carried out.
The results of these projects have shown that requirements of formal specifica-
tions are precise. Their correctness can be checked and increased. However, to
apply these formal methods, one needs a strong mathematical background. The
involvement of railway engineers in formally specifying, analyzing and verifying
requirements is quite limited in these projects. As a result, formal methods are
not commonly used in the railway domain. The main goal of this work is to
develop an engineering-oriented formal framework, such that not only computer
scientists, but also railway engineers can benefit from the ideas of formal meth-
ods. The developed formal framework is called Object-Based Lastenheft (OBLH).
This framework is composed of well-defined mathematical concepts and ideas for
specifying, analyzing and verifying interlocking system requirements. A tool called
the OBLH tool is also implemented, such that mathematical operations of these
concepts can be executed automatically. This framework is based on applications
of propositional logic and decision tables. In this framework, railway engineers
can specify system requirements formally in both propositional logic and deci-
sion tables. Specifications become clear and unambiguous. The requirements in
propositional logic can be transformed to decision tables, such that they can be
easily analyzed by different professions. Once requirements are specified formally,
computer scientists or railway engineers can carry out analysis and verification of
the specifications based on the defined methods in the OBLH tool. This formal
xiv
framework was successfully applied in an industrial project. It was shown that
railway engineers played an active role in using this formal framework. The for-
mally specified system requirements become precise and easy to be understood.
Furthermore, the correctness of these requirements is also increased. In conclusion,
OBLH is an engineering-oriented formal framework which can successfully bring
the advantages of using formal methods to different professions. The product of
this framework is a clear, explicit and correct interlocking system requirements
specification. Clear and correct system requirements reduce the costs of system
developments and the safety of the systems is also increased.
Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the functions of a railway interlocking system (RIS) is to establish safe
routes. No train collisions can happen when scheduled trains are driven along
these safe routes. In the German railway domain, most of the interlocking systems
are realized by computer programs. The functionalities of these computer-based
interlocking systems are written in documents, interlocking system requirements
specifications (e.g. LH-ESTW-R [Tut06]). System requirements in these specifica-
tions are implemented by system development teams that are composed of experts
from different professions, like railway engineers and computer scientists. These
specifications share some similar characteristics. They are written in German nat-
ural language. Their system requirements are expressed and elaborated by using
complex railway scenarios and concepts. These complicated railway concepts are
not easy to be understood and implemented by team members, the efficiency of the
system development might then be affected. Furthermore, it is well-known that
system requirements written in natural language can cause misinterpretations.
Their correctness is also difficult to be checked. Incorrectness in requirements
can result in errors in the output of each development phase. More resources are
needed to amend these errors if they are found in a later stage of the development
process. In the worst case, these errors might cost life of humans. Therefore, for a
safety critical system, like RIS, ensuring the clarity and correctness of its system
requirements is an important task.
One way to handle these problems is to apply formal methods in interlock-
ing system development processes. In formal methods, system requirements must
be expressed by the defined mathematical languages. Via the well-defined syntax
and semantics of the languages, unclearness and misinterpretations can be avoided.
Once requirements are formally defined based on the specification languages, math-
ematical concepts can be applied to analyze the correctness of these requirements.
Programs can then be implemented to carry out the mathematical operations of
these concepts automatically. The CENELEC railway application standards have
also addressed the importance of using formal methods for developing railway sys-
tems and the assessment of the safety integrity levels of these systems is affected
by the formality of their development processes [CEN99, CEN00b, CEN00a]. Be-
cause of the advantages of using formal methods and suggestions from CENELEC,
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the feasibility of applying formal methods to interlocking system development has
been investigated in a number of research projects.
These research projects have shown that incorrectness of system requirements
can be found and the clarity of specifications also increases. However, railway
engineers play a passive role in the whole formal system development process.
Without the corresponding mathematical background, railway engineers have no
chance to specify the system model formally. System models and checking con-
ditions for verification are mostly defined by formal experts and no assistance is
provided for railway engineers to understand these mathematical models or condi-
tions in these projects. The correctness of their definitions depends entirely on the
formal experts’ understanding of the railway domain. Confidence of railway engi-
neers in these definitions and the corresponding verification results are therefore
decreased. As a result, applications of formal methods have not become popular
among railway engineers.
These observations have motivated this research work. The main goal of this
work is to develop an engineering-oriented formal framework, such that different
professions of interlocking system development teams can benefit from the ideas
of formal methods. Moreover, the framework should be designed to be used in
the early stage of the development process, such that unclearness and inconsistent
requirements will not be brought to the next phase of the system development pro-
cess. This framework should be composed of mathematically well-defined concepts
and ideas for specifying, analyzing and verifying interlocking system requirements.
Because of the formal definitions of these concept, a tool can then be implemented,
such that these concepts can be executed automatically. Support for railway engi-
neers to understand formally specified requirements must be provided. They must
also able to specify and check the correctness of these formal requirements with
the help of the developed tool alone.
In Chapter 2, a general introduction to German railway interlocking systems
is first given. The characteristics of their specifications and the problems that
are caused by these characteristics are also discussed in this chapter. In the next
chapter, formal methods and their applications to the railway domain are then
introduced and the mentioned motivation is further elaborated. In Chapter 4,
the concepts and the tool that have been developed to achieve the goals of this
work are explained informally. The mathematical background and the concepts
of the development framework are introduced and formally defined in Chapter 5.
The discussion and conclusion of this work are given in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7,
respectively.
Chapter 2
Railway Interlocking Systems and
Interlocking System
Requirements Specifications
Before a train arrives at or departs from a railway station, the railway interlock-
ing systems (RIS) is responsible for setting up safe routes (German: Fahrstraße)
based on safe route requests. It ensures the proper usage and setting of each
infrastructure element along the safe route. Safe routes ensure that no train col-
lision would happen and the trains can be driven from the planned starts to the
planned destinations. Interlocking system requirements specifications, like [Tut06],
specify requirements that need to be implemented in a German regional computer-
based interlocking system, such that development of safe routes can be guaran-
teed. Therefore, the system development teams must interpret the specifications
correctly, such that the requirements can be properly implemented. However,
most of the interlocking system requirements specifications are written in natural
languages. These system requirements are specified with certain characteristics.
These two properties might lead to some problems to the system development.
In this chapter, an introduction to railway stations and infrastructure elements
is given in Section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, respectively. The principles of interlocking
systems are then discussed. The final section focuses on the characteristics of
interlocking system requirements specifications and the corresponding problems
that might be brought to the system development teams.
2.1 Railway Stations and Infrastructure Elements
As mentioned above, an RIS establishes safe routes by coordinating the setting and
employment of infrastructure elements of railway stations, such that safe move-
ments of every train through a station are guaranteed. In order to understand
the definition and the principles for developing safe routes, one has to know the
basic components, called infrastructure elements, of a railway station. Different
countries have different kinds of names, definitions and philosophies to describe
their railway systems. The focus of this work is put on the German practice only.
4 RISs AND THEIR SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, railway stations and infrastructure elements that have been
considered in this work are introduced and described.
2.1.1 Railway Stations
Figure 2.1 shows the layout of a railway station. A railway station is located
within the home signals limits (German: Bahnhof) in German railways [Pac04a,
Pac04b]. The home signals limits are defined by a pair of opposite home signals,
that are A and F in Figure 2.1. They consist of minimally one turnout for diverting
trains from one track to another (see 2.1.2). Trains might arrive, depart and pass
within the home signals limits. The interlocking system coordinates settings of the
infrastructure elements within the home signals limits to ensure safe movements
of trains that might pass through or stop at the station. The main tracks that are
located outside the home signal limits are called open line.
Figure 2.1: The layout of railway station CSStadt
2.1.2 Infrastructure Elements
There are different kinds of infrastructure elements that are located within the
home signals limits. The type of infrastructure elements that have been considered
in this work are the following ones:
• Tracks: The basic infrastructure components are tracks (German: Gleis)
that trains run on. Tracks can be further classified into main tracks and
sidings based on the role they play in the movements of railway vehicles. The
authorized movements, called train movements, of railway vehicles are only
allowed on main tracks, while making up a train, called shunting movements,
are undergone only on sidings.
In Figure 2.1, main tracks are GA1, GA2, GA3 and GA4. The direction
of traffic of each track is specified by arrows. For example, in Figure 2.1,
bi-directional traffic is allowed on all tracks. This means a train from Bheim
can stop on the track GA2 at the signal N1, while a train from DWald can
stop on the track GA2 at the signal P1. These two events should not happen
at the same time, otherwise a collision would take place.
• Points: Instead of moving only straight ahead, trains can also turn to another
track. For this purpose, there are different kinds of track arrangements:
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Figure 2.2: A turnout
turnouts and crossings. As mentioned in Section 2.1, home signal limits
consist of at least one turnout. A turnout allows trains to move from one
track to another. A turnout (see Figure 2.2) is composed of movable points
(German: Weiche), rails and a frog. A train can divert to another track
when the points are set in a proper position such that the train runs into
the correct track. In Figure 2.3, in order to develop a route from A to B
or B to A, the point is set to the direction of the straight track (German:
Stammgleis) and from A to C or C to A, the point is set to the direction of the
diverging track (German: Zweiggleis). Furthermore, the vehicle movement
from A to B or A to C is called a facing point movement (German: Spitz
befahren). The vehicle movement from B to A or C to A is called a trailing
point movement (German: Stumpf befahren).
Figure 2.3: A point
Another kind of track arrangement that can be found in home signal limits
is a crossing (German: Kreuzung). It allows trains to cross other tracks at
an angle [Bon01].
• Signals: Signals and tracks are called track elements. Signals are important
components that are used to control the train or shunting movements and
control the speed of trains, such that no collision would take place. There
are different kinds of signals within the home signals limits: Home signals,
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exit signals and intermediate interlocking signals. Home signals are used
to indicate the starting and ending point of the home signals limits and
guide the train to enter the home signals limits. In Figure 2.1, the home
signal A directs trains that are driven from Bheim to CSStadt while signal F
directs trains coming from DWald to CSStadt. Exit signals are responsible
to guide trains to leave the home signal limits to the open line. Intermediate
interlocking signals are those signals that are neither home nor exit signals
within the home signal limits. Many railways use three signal aspects: stop,
approach and clear. When a signal indicates a stop aspect, drivers must stop
the train. With an approach aspect, drivers should prepare to stop at the
next signal, in other words, the driver should start to reduce the speed of
the train. Finally, clear aspect means that the driver can drive into the track
behind this signal.
2.2 Railway Interlocking Systems
An RIS has a number of functionalities. One of the functions is displaying the sta-
tus of safe routes development and the conditions of each infrastructure element
of the railway station on the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the interlocking
system (German: Anzeige der Fahrdienstleiterarbeitsoberfla¨che). Another impor-
tant function is developing, monitoring and releasing safe routes within a railway
station, such that trains can reach their destinations safely. An RIS consists of an
interlocking logic and an interlocking machine. The realization of the principles of
interlocking is called the interlocking logic (German: Fahrstraßenlogik). In other
words, this interlocking logic needs to be implemented in the RIS, such that a safe
route can be properly developed, monitored and released. An interlocking machine
is used to control and interlock the track elements to ensure that they function
properly for the safe route.
In this section, the definition of a safe route is first given. Then, interlocking
logics and interlocking machines are briefly described.
2.2.1 Safe Routes
A safe route is composed of a route (German: Fahrweg), an overlap (German:
Durchrutschweg/DWeg) and the flank protections (German: Flankenschutz) for
the route and overlap (see Figure 2.4). The infrastructure elements that are part
of the safe route must be set properly. They are locked as elements for this safe
route based on their function provided for the safe route, such that the development
of conflicting routes can be avoided.
The components of a safe route are further discussed as follows:
• Route: The route is used by the train to move from the planned start to
the planned route destination (German: Ziel). Elements that are located
between the start and the destination of the route are reserved and locked
as route elements (German:Fahrwegelement). Their proper setting for safe
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Figure 2.4: A safe route
routes is also marked during the reservation. The RIS checks the setting and
marking of elements, when elements are requested to be used by another
requested safe route. For example, to develop the route A.N21, the point
W21 must not be reserved or locked for other safe routes and is put to the
direction of the straight track. In Figure 2.4, the route begins at the signal
A and ends at the signal N2. The train director (German: Fahrdienstleiter)
inputs the command A.N2 into the RIS, such that the RIS will start to
develop this requested safe route. FWZ1 indicates the route of this requested
safe route. The route elements of FWZ1 are the point W21, the signal A,
signal N2 and the track section between the signals. During the development
of FWZ1, W21 is reserved and is marked as the direction of the straight track
because this is the proper setting of W21 for FWZ1. If elements are locked or
reserved for a safe route as route elements, they must be used by other safe
routes as route elements. Otherwise, collision might happen when a route
element is locked or reserved for more than one route as route element and
be used at the same time.
• Overlap: The overlap is a track section that is in front of the route. This
track section must be ensured to be clear, such that if the driver does not
stop the train in time, the train will not collide with a train ahead. Elements
along the overlap are locked as overlap elements, for example, W22 is locked
as an overlap element for DWegZ1 in Figure 2.4.
• Flank protection: Flank protection ensures that no trains can be driven into
the safe route through points. This means, RIS needs to search flank protec-
tions for points that belong to the route and overlap. An element that pro-
vides flank protection to a route element or overlap element is called a flank
protection element (German: Flankenschutzelement). Signals and points can
be flank protection elements. The points that provide flank protections need
to be set properly, such that trains cannot run into track sections of the safe
1X.Y is the RIS input command of a safe route development. X indicates the start and Y
indicates the requested route destination.
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route. For example, in Figure 2.4, W11 provides a flank protection FLZ1,W21
to W21, while the flank protection FLZ1,W22 of W22 is provided by W12.
W11 and W12 need to be set to the straight position, such that trains on
track 1 cannot run into track 2.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, trains might arrive, depart and pass through
a railway station. Safe routes can be classified into three categories. They are
safe entrance routes (German: Einfahrstraßen), exit safe routes (German: Aus-
fahrstraßen) and non-stop safe routes (German: Durchfahrstraßen).
• Safe entrance routes (German: Einfahrstraßen): When a train is scheduled to
stop at the railway station, a safe entrance route is requested to be established
before its arrival. A safe entrance route is composed of a route, an overlap
and the flank protection for the route and overlap. The route begins at a
home signal and ends at an exit signal within the home signals limits. For
example, in Figure 2.6, if a train comes from the direction of Bheim and is
scheduled to stop in front of N1, then a safe entrance route is composed of
FWZ1, DWegZ1, FLZ1,W1 and FLZ1,W2.
• Safe exit routes (German: Ausfahrstraßen): An safe exit route is established
for the train to depart the railway station and be driven to the open line. It is
composed of a route and the flank protection for this route. An safe exit route
begins at an exit signal and ends at the interface. This interface separates
the home signals limit and open line is called interface Bf/Str (German:
Schnittstelle Bahnhof/Strecke (Bf/Str)). Interface Bf/Str is normally located
between the last point of the railway station and the beginning of the open
line (see Figure 2.5). RIS needs to ensure the block systems’ requirements
have been fulfilled in the track section between the interface Bf/Str and
the first block signal. For example, in Figure 2.5, this track section is the
space between the interface Str/Bf and Signal 11. Ensuring the safe train
separation in open lines is guaranteed by automatic block systems (German:
Streckenblock) in most of the German track sections.
• Non-stop safe routes (German: Durchfahrstraßen): A non-stop safe route is
composed of a safe entrance route and an safe exit route. In Figure 2.6, the
non-stop safe route is composed of the safe entrance route (FWZ1,DWegZ1,
FLZ1,W1 and FLZ1,W2) and the safe exit route (FWZ2 and FLZ2,W2). A
non-stop safe route can also be established by requesting the safe exit route
and safe entrance route separately or together.
2.2.2 Interlocking Logic
The principles of interlocking state that all movable elements within a safe route
must be set and locked properly, conflicting routes must be locked and the tracks
must be clear before issuing the safe route to a train. An interlocking logic is
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Figure 2.5: An safe exit route
Figure 2.6: An non-stop route
defined to achieve these goals. In German computer-based interlockings, a number
of procedures and statuses of safe routes are defined to achieve these goals. For
example, the possibility to develop a requested safe route is checked in a procedure
called Zulassungspru¨fung Zugstraße. In this thesis, it is named as ZPZ and it will
not be translated into English. The possibility of reserving or locking each of
the infrastructure elements along the safe route is analyzed. The usage of each
infrastructure element within the requested route and overlap is checked based
on defined conditions called ZPZ conditions (German: ZPZ-Bedingungen). One of
these conditions is that the requested route element must not be reserved or locked
for another route. One of the purposes of ZPZ is to avoid setting up conflicting
routes. If the elements within the requested safe route fulfill all ZPZ conditions,
then ZPZ of this safe route is said to be positive. In other words, the requested safe
route reaches a status called ZPZ positiv. The remaining procedures and statuses
of a safe route are defined for monitoring these settings continuously until the safe
route is properly used and released.
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2.3 Interlocking System Requirements Specifica-
tions and their Problems
In the German railway domain, interlocking system requirements specifications are
mostly written in German. One of the example of these specifications is [Tut06].
This specification shares similar characteristics with the other interlocking system
requirements specifications. One of the characteristics is various system require-
ments are specified in this document (e.g. the GUI of the interlocking system). As
it has been mentioned before, these characteristics might bring some problems to
the system development teams who need to implement the interlocking system.
Therefore, the characteristics of these system requirements and the possible prob-
lems must be analyzed based on an example. They are summarized and discussed
based on the example LH-ESTW-R as follows:
• System requirements are written in natural language. Some sentences that
are written in natural language are ambiguous and unclear. Terms are often
not precisely defined. Ambiguous statements can be interpreted in different
ways by different professions. For example,
Example 1
No. System Requirement
5.2.2 Es kann angezeigt werden: Ks1 oder Ks2 und zusa¨tzlich
Zs3-Anzeige.
Table 2.1: System requirement 5.2.2
The sentence in Table 2.1 can be interpreted in the following two ways:
”It can be indicated: Ks1 or Ks2 and in both cases an additional Zs3-
Indicator” (German: Es kann angezeigt werden: Ks1 oder Ks2 und in beiden
Fa¨lle zusa¨tzlich mit Zs3-Anzeige)
or
”It can be indicated: Ks1 or it can be indicated: Ks2 and additional Zs3-
Indicator” (German: Es kann angezeigt werden: Ks1 oder es kann angezeigt
werden: Ks2 und zusa¨tzlich Zs3-Anzeige)
As it has been mentioned above, the system development teams design and
develop an RIS based on the system requirements. When a member of the
teams implements the requirement stated in this example, then it might
cause confusion. One needs to decide the interpretation that will be taken
for the implementation. The development process might become inefficient,
because further discussions between team members from different disciplines
will take place to consider the choices of these interpretations.
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• A part of system requirements is written and defined based on complex
railway concepts and scenarios. For example,
Example 2
No. System Requirement
2.3.7 2. Einfahrt der zu kuppelnden Zu¨ge aus entgegengesetzter
Richtung
Fu¨r beide Zu¨ge ist das Zugstraßenziel der jeweilige fiktive
Zielpunkt mit D-Weg null (Gegenfahrausschluss)
Table 2.2: System requirement 2.3.7
The system requirement in Table 2.2 consists of three complex railway con-
cepts: the virtual route destination’s point (German: fiktiver Zielpunkt), the
length of the overlap is zero and locking of conflicting routes from the oppo-
site direction (German: Gegenfahrausschluss). It is not easy to understand
the relationship between these three concepts immediately. Many issues need
to be considered and analyzed in order to implement this requirement. One
of these issues is the role of this virtual route destination’s point w.r.t. the
developing requested safe route, in other words, the reservation of the route
destination’s point as a route or an overlap element. Since the length of
the overlap is zero, one can interpret the concepts as no reservation of the
point as an overlap element is needed. However, if this is implemented, then
conflicting routes cannot be excluded.
This type of system requirements can be easily understood by railway en-
gineers. However, for the other members of the system development teams,
like computer scientists, it is difficult to understand and analyze the mean-
ing of these statements and concepts. Discussion among professions from
different areas become complicated.
• Some system requirements which describe the same or similar concepts are
defined in different chapters, based on different views and aspects. This
characteristic is further discussed based on the following examples:
Example 3
Table 2.3 shows two system requirements which define the same concept,
overlapping overlaps (German: u¨berlappende D-Wege). They are specified
in different chapters. Without the system requirement 1.7, one might have
difficulties to understand the system requirement 2.2.1 because the definition
of positions of the point (German: Lage) and the locking of the requested
overlaps (the German sentence: ”...den neu hinzukommenden D-Weg nicht
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No. System Requirement
1.7 D-Weg der Zugstraße
- DWege ko¨nnen sich gleich- oder gegenla¨ufig u¨berlappen,
falls sie sich nicht u¨ber spitz zur Durchrutschrichtung
liegende, verschlossene Weichen oder Weichen mit
beweglichen Herzstu¨ckspitzen ausschließen.
2.2.1 U¨berlappende D-Wege
Im Bereich Ziel-D-Weg-Ziel du¨rfen ein oder mehrere
D-Wege vorhanden sein, wenn die verschlossenen Weichen dieser
D-Wege durch ihre Lage den neu hinzukommenden D-Weg nicht
ausschließen (U¨berlappende D-Wege)
Table 2.3: System requirements 1.7 and 2.2.1
ausschließen”) are not specified in this requirement. These two definitions
have been well-elaborated in the system requirement 1.7. For example, one
of the conditions of the point is that it must not be equipped with a movable
frog (German: bewegliche Herzstu¨ckspitze ausschließen). In order to realize
this complex scenario, one must be familiar with the specification, such that
it can be correctly analyzed and understood. Furthermore, inconsistency of
these requirements cannot be checked easily. If inconsistencies do exist in
these specifications, then the problem of unclear interpretation might also
be caused.
• The same problems are caused when the system specifications are defined
w.r.t. different views of the same concepts in a chapter. For example, check-
ing conditions of ZPZ of the requested route are written in two different
views: view of a safe route (German: ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die gesamte
Zugfahrstraße) and view of an infrastructure object located within the route
(German: ZPZ-Bedingungen je Fahrwegelement im Fahrweg). An example
is shown in Table 2.4,
Example 4
Given the situation in which a point is not equipped with a movable frog
(see Figure 2.7), it is then unclear whether ZPZ of the requested overlap
will be evaluated to be positive w.r.t. these two specifications. Based on the
system requirement 2.2.1, ZPZ of the requested overlap DWegZ2 is evaluated
to be positive because the direction of DWegZ2 is coming from the trailing
point and W1 is not equipped with a movable frog. However, the system
requirement 2.4.1 states that a point is not allowed to be locked or reserved
for another overlap in an improper position of DWegZ2. In Figure 2.7, the
point W1 is reserved or locked for the overlap DWegZ1 and it is reserved to
the diverging direction, as a result, ZPZ of DWegZ2 is negative.
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No. System Requirement
2.2 ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die gesamte Zugfahrstraße
2.2.1 U¨berlappende D-Wege
Im Bereich Ziel-D-Weg-Ziel du¨rfen ein oder mehrere
D-Wege vorhanden sein, wenn die verschlossenen Weichen dieser
D-Wege durch ihre Lage den neu hinzukommenden D-Weg nicht
ausschließen (U¨berlappende D-Wege)
2.4 ZPZ-Bedingungen je Fahrwegelement im Durchrutschweg
2.4.1 ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r Weiche ohne bewegliche
Herzstu¨ckspitzen
a)Die Weiche darf nicht in der Nicht-Solllage gegen
Umstellen gesperrt sein.
a)Die Weiche darf nicht in der Nicht-Solllage beansprucht sein.
Table 2.4: System requirements 2.2.1 and 2.4.1
Figure 2.7: Overlapping overlaps
• The specification [Tut06] consists of different types of system requirements of
an RIS, two of them are the GUI of the RIS and the interlocking logic. Some
of the requirements consist of a mixture of specifications that are related to
different functions of the RIS.
Example 5
No. System Requirement
2.1.3 Kennzeichnung der FW-EL und gru¨nes Band
Ist das Ergebnis der Zulassungspru¨fung entsprechend den nach-
folgenden Bedingungen positiv (ZPZ positiv), werden die Fahr-
weg elemente (FW-EL) fu¨r die Zugstraße markiert und auf
der Anzeige darf das gru¨ne Band vom Start bis zum Ziel angesch-
altet werden. Belegte Gleisabschnitte oder solche mit
gesto¨rter Gleisfreimeldung bleiben rot ausgeleuchtet.
Table 2.5: System requirements 2.1.3
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With the title of the system requirement in Table 2.5, it is classified as a
system requirement for the GUI of the RIS. However, it also consists of a
system requirement for the interlocking logic which is the German statement
”Ist das Ergebnis der Zulassungspru¨fung entsprechend den nachfolgenden
Bedingungen positiv (ZPZ positiv), werden die Fahrwegelemente (FW-EL)
fu¨r die Zugstraße markiert.” This means, if the elements within the requested
safe route fulfill the corresponding ZPZ conditions, then these elements are
marked as the elements of the requested safe route. It is unclear whether this
marking shall be only indicated in the GUI, or it is the logical reservation of
elements for the requested safe route.
Unclear definitions might cause confusions and wrong interpretations to the
system development teams. Confusion can be clarified by further discussions
among members from different development teams. This costs time and
resources. However, a wrong interpretation might cause errors in design
or implementation. In this example, if this statement was classified as a
requirement for the GUI only, then a logical reservation of a route element is
not made in the developed RIS. The costs of amending errors are very high
when they are found later in the system development process. Furthermore,
the wrong interpretation might also bring difficulties for the analysis of the
correctness of the specification because some system requirements for the
interlocking logic are missing for analysis and verification. To illustrate this
problem, the following artificial statement is considered:
No. System Requirement
x Positive Zulassungspru¨fung ZPZ
Nach positiver Zulassungspru¨fung du¨rfen die Fahrwegelemente
(FW-EL) fu¨r die Zugstraße nicht markiert werden.
Table 2.6: An artificial system requirement
This statement is classified as system requirement for the interlocking logic.
It would be clearly inconsistent to the system requirement 2.1.3. However,
it might not be possible to check this type of inconsistency if the developer
classified the system requirement 2.1.3 as a specification for the GUI of the
RIS.
Since some specifications are mixtures of requirements from different types,
members of the system development teams cannot obtain an overview over
the system requirements quickly. System development teams are composed
of different groups. Each group is assigned to specific implementation and
design tasks. For example, a team is responsible to implement the GUI of
the RIS exclusively. Based on this property of this specification, it is not
easy to assign tasks to each team efficiently.
In conclusion, the specification is written in German natural language. Some
system requirements that are written in natural languages might be unclear. Un-
clear sentences cause problems for the system development teams to understand
and interpret the requirements. Further discussions must take place in order to
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consider and solve the unclearnesses and possible interpretations. This increases
the development costs of the system. If this type of unclearness can be avoided
in this early stage of a system development process, the system development will
become more cost effective and efficient. Furthermore, some requirements are
specified based on complex scenarios and railway terms. Discussions among ex-
perts from different professions might become complicated. Computer scientists
have difficulties in analyzing these concepts for the implementations. Finally, the
correctness of the specification is difficult to be checked because it is written in
a natural language and it is written in a particular structure (e.g. a requirement
specification written in different chapters, aspects and views). Incorrect and com-
plicated system specifications might lead to a wrong interpretation resulting in
an error in the system software. If this error is found in the later stage of the
system development process, it then becomes expensive to correct this error (see
Figure 2.8). In the German railway domain, the writing style of interlocking sys-
tem requirements is coherent. Therefore, the stated characteristics and problems
will also appear not only in this analyzed specification, but also in other inter-
locking system requirements specifications. It is then important to search possible
solutions to deal with these problems.
Figure 2.8: Costs for correcting an error during different phases in a system de-
velopment process [KM08]
Chapter 3
Formal Methods and their
Applications to the Railway
Domain
The characteristics of the system requirements of regional computer-based RIS and
the possible problems that they might bring to system development teams have
been discussed in section 2.3. One of the possible ways in helping to lessen the
effect of these problems is the application of formal methods. This is one of the
goals of this research work, investigating the reasons and possibilities for applying
formal methods to specify interlocking system requirements.
In this chapter, a general introduction to formal methods is given. The ad-
vantages of applying them to specify interlocking system requirements are then
discussed. The last section of this chapter describes the current applications of
formal methods in the railway domain and their results. Furthermore, the experi-
ence that are gained from the studies and their applicability to this research work
are discussed.
3.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods provide a mathematical framework to users for specifying and
analyzing system requirements [Win90, Mon03, TE04, Bow97]. Tools are imple-
mented based on the mathematical concepts of frameworks to verify a system
design against these system requirements. As a result, applying formal methods
to develop systems becomes an important research topic [HB95].
In this section, a general introduction to formal methods is first given. The
advantages of applying them in the system development process are then discussed.
3.1.1 Introduction to Formal Methods
System requirements are said to be formally specified if they are expressed by ap-
plying mathematical concepts and mathematical logic. Formal methods provide
a framework to specify system requirements formally. The first component of a
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formal method is a formal specification language [AP98]. The language comprises
syntax (notations) and semantics (meaning of the notations). The semantic mean-
ing of every notation is mathematically and clearly defined. As a result, one can
formalize the same concept with equivalent notations and if the formalizations
are correct, there will be only one meaning of those formalizations. Propositional
logic (see Section 5.1) is one of these mathematical specification languages. For
example,
Example 6
No. System Requirement logical meaning
2.3.1 ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r Weiche
a)Die Weiche darf nicht in Nicht-Solllage ¬(¬Solllage∧
verschlossen sein. EL(v))
Table 3.1: The system requirement 2.3.1(a)
Solllage: The object is in the proper position for the requested
safe route.
Das Element liegt in der Solllage fu¨r die einzustellende
Zugstraße.
EL(v): The object is locked as a route, an overlap or a flank protection
Element of other routes.
Das Element ist als Fahrwegelement oder DWeg-Element oder
Flankenschutzelement fu¨r eine andere Zugstraße verschlossen.
(Solllage ∨ ¬EL(v)) means, if the point is in a proper position, it is not im-
portant whether it is locked or not, however if it is not in the proper position,
then it should not be locked. One can also formalize the sentence equivalently as
(EL(v)→ Solllage). This sentence can be read as ”if the point is locked, then it
is also in the proper position for the requested safe route.”. Although the concept
is represented by different notations, the semantic meaning has not changed and
there is only one way to interpret the concept. This equivalent relationship can be
found by the syntactical part of the language. For example,
Requirement2.3.1 ≡ ¬(¬Solllage ∧ EL(v))
≡ Solllage ∨ ¬EL(v)
≡ EL(v)→ Solllage
The second component of formal methods is analysis and verification of well-
formalized specifications. If the methods for verifying and analyzing specifica-
tions are well-defined, computer programs can be implemented based on the con-
cepts. The tasks can be carried out automatically. For example, a well-formalized
specification or design can be verified against the expected behavior of the sys-
tem [Som04, Koo99]. One of the formal verification tools is a model checker. A
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model checker implements the concepts of the formal method called model check-
ing [CGP99]. One can formalize a design of an interlocking system as a transition
system and the expected behavior of the system as checking conditions, for exam-
ple, safety requirements (German: Sicherheitsregeln) [HK06]. The model checker
verifies the transition system against checking conditions. It produces a counterex-
ample if the transition system does not conform with the condition.
3.1.2 Advantages of Using Formal Methods
The above discussed components of formal methods can bring advantages to users
in specifying system requirements, like [Tut06] as follows:
• Reduction of ambiguity of specifications: The well-defined formal specifica-
tion language can help to avoid an unclearness in a specification because
each requirement must be specified as a precise mathematical statement. In
Example 1 on page 10, there exists two ways to interpret the sentence in
Table 2.1. These two interpretations can be defined by propositional logic
as follows:
Example 7
No. System Requirement logical meaning
5.2.2 Es kann angezeigt werden: Ks1 oder First interpretation:
Ks2 und zusa¨tzlich Zs3-Anzeige. (KS1 ∨KS2) ∧ Zs3
5.2.2 Es kann angezeigt werden: Ks1 oder Second interpretation:
Ks2 und zusa¨tzlich Zs3-Anzeige. KS1 ∨ (KS2 ∧ Zs3)
Table 3.2: The system requirement 5.2.2 and logical meanings
KS1: The object indicates Ks1.
Das Element zeigt Ks1 an.
KS2: The object indicates Ks2.
Das Element zeigt Ks2 an.
Zs3: The object indicates Zs3.
Das Element zeigt Zs3 an.
By applying formal methods in the development process, system require-
ments need to be specified based on the formal specification language of the
corresponding formal methods, each requirement becomes an explicit math-
ematical statement, like in Example 7, the specifier can either define the
corresponding requirement as (KS1 ∨KS2) ∧ Zs3 or KS1 ∨ (KS2 ∧ Zs3).
Furthermore, a single interpretation is deduced from the statement and mis-
leading interpretations can be avoided (see Example 6 on page 17). When
the specification is unambiguous, it is easier for professions from different ar-
eas to discuss the specification or understand the system and the discussion
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becomes efficient because terms are well defined and equivalent concepts can
be deduced by the mathematical rules. In the case of computer-based inter-
locking systems, if the specification is expressed by mathematical concepts
or logics, computer scientists who do not have sufficient knowledge in railway
systems can relatively easy understand the specification. This can increase
the efficiency of the software development process and the correctness of
software systems.
• Increasing the understandability of specifications: It is sometimes difficult
to understand and analyze the meaning of a requirement that is written in
natural language (see Examples 2 on page 11 and 3 on page 11). With the
help of mathematical concepts, one can capture the meaning and concept of
a statement efficiently. The requirement 1.7 that is specified in Table 3.3 can
be specified as follows:
Example 8
No. System Requirement logical meaning
1.7 D-Weg der Zugstraße
- DWege ko¨nnen sich gleich- oder
gegenla¨ufig u¨berlappen, falls sie ¬(¬Solllage
sich nicht u¨ber spitz zur Durch- ∧Spitz ∧DWEL(v))
rutschrichtung liegende, verschlossene ∧¬(¬Solllage
Weichen oder Weichen mit beweglichen ∧BHSS ∧DWEL(v)))
Herzstu¨ckspitzen ausschließen.
Table 3.3: The system requirement 1.7 and the logical meaning
DWEL(v): The object is locked as an overlap element of other routes.
Als DWeg-Element (DW≥0) fu¨r eine oder mehrere Zugstra-
ßen verschlossen.
Spitz: The requested overlap of the safe route is a
facing point movement.
Der einzustellende DWeg la¨uft u¨ber eine spitz zur Durchru-
tschrichtung liegende Weiche.
BHSS: The object is equipped with a movable frog.
Das Element ist mit beweglicher Herzstu¨ckspitze ausgeru¨stet.
Requirement1.7 ≡ ¬(¬Solllage ∧ Spitz ∧DWEL(v)) ∧ ¬(¬Solllage
∧BHSS ∧DWEL(v))
≡ ¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage ∨ (¬Spitz ∧ ¬BHSS))
The concept of overlapping overlaps has been illustrated mathematically in
this example. The propositional formula ¬DWEL(v)∨Solllage∨ (¬Spitz∧
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¬BHSS)) expresses the meaning of this concept1. One can use this formula
to check whether the requested overlap is considered as an admitted overlap.
The cases are summarized as follow:
1. The point is not locked for another route as an overlap element.
2. The point is in a proper position for the requested overlap.
3. If the point is not in a proper position and locked for another safe route
as an overlap element, then the requested overlap must be a facing point
movement and the point must not be equipped with a movable frog.
The concept that is written in natural language in Table 3.3 is now easier
to understand. Furthermore, a given situation can be analyzed with the
help of this logical formula (see Figure 3.1 and 3.2). The number of possible
situations that are described by the concept can also be generated.
Figure 3.1: Analysis of a situation
1Requirement 1.7 is a general specification, other situations w.r.t. this concept will be fully
elaborated in another part (e.g. ZPZ conditions) of the interlocking system requirement specifi-
cation.
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Figure 3.2: Admitted overlapping overlaps
• Checking the correctness of specifications: In formal methods, this is achieved
by reasoning of the formal specification (see Section 5.1.3). For example, Fig-
ure 3.3 shows a system development process called V-model. In the stage of
system requirements, these requirements are specified with a set of logical
statements. When it is noticed that there exists a statement which is true
and false at the same time in the set, then inconsistency is said to be found.
Furthermore, equivalent concepts can be deduced by applying the syntax
rules of the mathematical language. A concept or system requirement in
different views or aspects can be first specified as two formulas. If these two
formulas are not equivalent, then an unclearness in the specification exists.
For instance, the type of unclearness that has been stated in Example 4.
Formal methods support proving the conformity of the specification to the
expected behavior of the system. If the specification does not fulfill the ex-
pected behavior, it means that the system has not been specified completely
or correctly. For example, the result produced during the phase of system
requirements can be verified against the output from the phase of user re-
quirements, it can check whether the developed system requirements satisfy
the requirements from the users. In other words, if the system requirements
specification, like [Tut06], can be verified against the safety requirements,
then the systems that are developed based on this specification also satisfy
the safety requirements.
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Figure 3.3: System development process, V-model
3.2 Applications of Formal Methods to the Rail-
way Domain
Because of the mentioned advantages, the importance of using formal methods to
specify and verify systems has been addressed in different fields, especially those
which develop safety critical systems [BC00]. The CENELEC railway application
standards [CEN99, CEN00b, CEN00a] are focused on the standardization of dif-
ferent European railway principles. The standard of developing railway software
has also been discussed and formal methods are suggested to be used in order to
increase the safety integrity levels of the softwares. As a result, investigations of
applying formal methods to the railway domain have become an active research
area. There are various research topics: defining railway specific languages by
using formal methods, formal verification of and automatic formal development of
railway control systems.
In this section, formal methods that have been investigated in the stated topics
are briefly introduced. Some of the corresponding investigations and their results
are discussed.
3.2.1 Set-theoretic Specifications
Z [Spi88] (Z notation), VDM [Jon90] (Vienna Development Method) and B-Method
[Sch01] are set-theoretic specifications. The mathematical concept of Z, VDM and
B-Method is set theory [Hal60]. In these formal methods, a system or an object is
composed of states which are defined as sets. The changes of the states are spec-
ified as the operations over the defined sets. These operations are described as
APPLICATIONS TO THE RAILWAY DOMAIN 23
pre- and post- conditions of sets and set-theoretic operations are used to describe
these conditions. In these three methods, the style of the specification languages
are slightly different from each other. However, the mathematical theory behind
is the same. As it has been mentioned above, when the specification language is
well-defined, tools can be developed to check and verify specified models. Tools for
Z, VDM and B-Method have been developed [Pro07, Ade08, Cor08]. The verifi-
cation of the model against the expected behavior is achieved by generating proof
obligations in these tools. The expected behavior is specified as invariants in these
three methods. An invariant is a condition which must always hold true in the
system or object.
One of the applications of set-theoretic specifications in railway domain is pre-
sented in [BS98]. In this project, a domain specification language for railway sys-
tems is developed. Defining a domain specification language is one way to achieve
the standardization of systems [EAF99] which is addressed in the CENELEC rail-
way application standard. A domain specification language is used to define the
meaning of every concept of a domain. These concepts are modeled by the chosen
modeling language (e.g. Z). One of the domain concepts in railway systems is the
meaning of a point. Once the domain specification language has been developed,
a railway system (e.g. an RIS) can be described by all these defined concepts. In
this project, concepts of railway systems, like routes, trains and functions of rail-
way systems, are defined by using RSL (Rigorous Approach to Industrial Software
Engineering Specification Language) [Gro95]. This language is developed based
on a number of formal languages. One of them is VDM. The specified railway
concepts are represented by the notations of set theory clearly. In order to use
and understand the defined domain language, one needs to understand the math-
ematical concepts behind RSL, like set theory. Other representation forms of the
domain language are not provided. Therefore, the use of the language does not
gain the popularity among railway engineers.
In [Han98], a design model of an RIS is formalized by using VDM abstractly.
The system is defined by using states’ changes of the tracks, points and signals in
the VDM specification language. The model of the interlocking system is specified
based on an informal system requirements specification. The possibility of checking
the correctness of these system requirements and the methods of transforming these
system requirements to the defined mathematical model have not been discussed
in this work. Nevertheless, in order to understand the specified model and the
invariants for the verification, one needs to have the mathematical background in
set theory.
Cooperations between commercial companies and the French railway com-
pany have been established for applying B-Method to verify and develop French
interlocking systems [LSP07]. One of them has been presented in the papers
[DM95, Mej98]. In this project, an existing system that operates the Paris fast
subway RPE line A is specified and verified by B-Method. The existing informal
design documents are modeled as mathematical models with the notations of B-
Method by a team. This team is composed of formal experts and development
engineers. The development engineers are trained for six or more months in an
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intensive course of B-Method before the start of the project. Applying B-Method
can increase the safety integrity of the system and the system requirement specifi-
cations become clear in this project. However, in [DM95], it has been stated that
the application of B-Method has not been optimized because of the difficulties of
engineers to apply mathematical concepts. Extensive guidance to the usage of
methods is needed in order to improve the quality of the usage of B-Method in the
project.
In these mentioned projects, the mathematic system models are checked against
the expected behavior of the systems. Therefore, the safety integrity of these sys-
tems is increased. Defined domain concepts are clear and unambiguous. However,
it has also been shown that in order to use Z, VDM and B-Method, the users
need to be familiar with set theory. Railway engineers might have less training in
this respect. As a result, system models are mostly defined by formal experts and
the participation of railway engineers in the system development process is rela-
tively small because they might have difficulties in understanding and analyzing
the meaning of those specified set-theoretic models.
3.2.2 Abstract Algebraic Specifications
Another formal method that has been investigated in the railway domain is ab-
stract algebraic specification. Maude [Mes06] is an example of abstract algebraic
specifications. The mathematical concept behind this formal method is abstract
data types [Mon03]. A system or an object is modeled as an abstract data type. A
sort and signature are defined for the data type. A sort is the name of the system
or object, while a signature is used to define the operations on the system or object,
respectively. The interpretation of an operation can be expressed as a predicate
axiom or an algebraic equation. If the interpretation is written as an equation,
then this abstract data type is called an algebraic abstract data type. And the
formal methods in which systems and objects are modeled by algebraic abstract
data types is called the abstract algebraic specification. If safety requirements
and expected behavior of the system or object are specified by algebraic abstract
data types, the object can be verified against safety requirements by equational
reasoning of the data types. An extension of algebraic specification is the process
algebraic specification [Bae05], like CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes)
and µCRL (micro Common Representation Language) [Gro97]. Process algebraic
specifications are used to model distributed systems. These systems are composed
of a number of processes. Mechanisms for defining communications between pro-
cesses and the concurrency of a system are defined in this specification. Tools
has been developed to support specification and verification of systems in abstract
algebraic specifications [CEW93].
In [HP00], a formal development process for a distributed railway control sys-
tem is introduced. In this distributed railway system, no railway signals are used.
The formal method that is used to support the development process is process
algebraic specification, CSP. The main concept of this case study is to develop the
formal specification of the system and safety requirements (e.g. no collision) step-
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wise and ensure the correctness of the formal specification in each step. Therefore,
in each step, the specification is verified against the safety requirements by equa-
tional reasoning. They are both refined when the specification fulfills the safety
requirements. Railway engineers participate only in the beginning of the whole
development process to describe the system properties. No transformation of the
specification and safety requirements from the algebraic specifications to another
semantic form has been mentioned. In order to develop a distributed railway con-
trol system with the concepts of this work, one needs to be familiar with abstract
algebraic specifications.
In [GVVK95], an developed interlocking system is verified by applying the
process algebraic specification. This interlocking system was implemented by VPI
(Vital Processor Interlocking). The system is expressed in the specification lan-
guage called µCRL as a model and safety requirements are specified in modal logic
[BdRV01] . µCRL is a type of process algebraic language. A specifier uses abstract
data types to define the system model in µCRL. Modal logic is a type of temporal
logic which can be used to specify the checking conditions of a transition system
(see Section 3.2.3). A verification tool is used to check whether the model fulfills
the specified requirements. If the model satisfies the requirements, the truth value
true is returned, otherwise false. In this case study, it ensures the modeled inter-
locking system satisfies the defined checking conditions. However, the correctness
of the defined checking conditions depends on the understanding of formal experts
w.r.t. the railway safety requirements. No specific methods have been developed to
check the correctness of the requirements and help railway engineers to be involved
in the process.
3.2.3 Behavior Specifications
Transition systems, finite state machines and temporal logics [HR04] are mathe-
matical concepts that are commonly used for behavior specifications. In a transi-
tion system or a finite state machine, the system or object is composed of states.
They change from one state to another when the corresponding defined condition
is fulfilled, this condition is called a triggering condition. Statecharts [Har87] and
UML state machines [omg05] are transition diagrams that represent a finite state
machine graphically. Temporal logic is used to describe general and abstract con-
ditions that the system or object need to satisfy over the evolvement of the system.
The verification technique model checking [CGP99] combines these two concepts
together. In model checking, the system is first modeled as a transition system
and the expected behavior of the system is defined in a temporal logic. A model
checker will then verify whether the general condition is satisfied in all the possible
states of the system. An example of a model checker is SMV (Statistical Model
Validation) [CGP99].
Statecharts have been chosen as one of the modeling languages to express
the functional requirements of interlocking systems in the Europen project Euro-
Interlocking [KE03] and INESS [INE09]. Although checking the correctness of the
functional models has not been addressed in both projects, a number of research
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projects were done to demonstrate the feasibility of verifiying behavior specifica-
tions in the railway domain. In [PGHD04], the concept of applying model checking
to an automatic railway control system development has been investigated. In this
case study, a tram control system is developed by the proposed concepts in the
paper [HP00]. The generic behavior of train movements and generic control rules
of the control system have been first defined as transition systems [HP02]. Then,
railway engineers provide a route table, signal setting table and the locking table
to formal experts. Based on this configuration data, an executable control system
which develops safe routes will be produced. In order to verify this system, safety
requirements are defined informally first and they are transformed into temporal
logic. The transition system is then verified by a model checker. If the system
satisfies safety requirements, it will be transformed into executable code for imple-
mentation. In this project, specification of the logic of the generic system (e.g. the
triggering conditions of the generic system) is done by formal experts. It provides
no chance for railway engineers to analyze the defined transition models and tem-
poral logical formulas. Therefore, without the mathematical background, railway
engineers obtain less chance to specify the generic behavior of the train movements
and generic control rules.
Other research activities applying model checking to the development and ver-
ification of interlocking systems have been carried out [CGM+98, Win02]. These
projects share the same characteristics as the project in [PGHD04]. Applying
model checking in the railway system development process provides a chance to
check the correctness of the system model against safety requirements of the sys-
tem. However, the specification of the transition system and safety requirements
is achieved by formal experts instead of railway engineers. Understanding and
interpretation of system properties for formal experts and railway engineers might
vary. One can only assume the defined model captures the whole system be-
havior and temporal checking conditions are correctly translated from the safety
requirements. Since the transition system grows more complex with capturing the
behavior of the system in more detail, one will have difficulties to understand the
model. No other form of representing the semantics of the mathematical models
has been investigated in order to help users to understand the system model.
3.2.4 Experience to Motivation
In conclusion, the discussed projects in this section concentrate on applying formal
methods to the whole system development process (see Figure 3.3). The impor-
tance of checking the correctness of informal system specifications with mathe-
matical concepts is not addressed. In other words, unclearness (see Example 4
on page 12) that exist in an informal system requirements specification cannot
be found based on the concepts of the mentioned projects. Before applying those
formal methods that have been described above, formal experts need to under-
stand the domain concepts and the informal system requirements specification in
oder to model the system. Railway engineers describe the system properties and
domain concepts to formal experts and assist them to understand the informal
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specification. Formal experts are then responsible to write down the requirements
in formulas and apply the corresponding formal specification language to com-
plete the models. If the unclearness in the system requirements specification has
not been found before, formal experts and railway engineers might overlook the
unclearness during their discussion about the informal specification. The defined
model might be wrong. This can also be applied to the specification of safety
requirements as mathematical checking conditions. Therefore, the correctness of
this informal system requirements specification must be checked.
The mathematical system is first modeled based on the informal system re-
quirements specification. Since the modeled system is described by mathematical
concepts, the specifications become now clear and well-defined. In other words,
computer scientists and railway engineers can understand the informal specifica-
tion by using this well-defined system model. As it has been mentioned before,
the well-defined system model is developed by formal experts. It is important
for railway engineers to examine this defined model because understanding and
interpretation of professions from different disciplines might vary, especially in
the cases of modeling complex railway concepts and scenarios (see Example 2 in
Section 2.3). However, the mathematical model might become complex and one
needs to be familiar with the corresponding mathematical concepts in order to
examine and understand the model. In the mentioned projects, railway engineers
are not provided with any assistance to understand and analyze the models or
formulas. They play a passive role in the whole formal development process. As a
result, applications of formal methods or mathematical concepts among engineers
or industries are not popular because the involvements of railway engineers in the
specification and verification process is not sufficient enough [Kni98].
This experience plays an important role in this research work. Based on the
above analysis, the focus of this research work is put on applying formal methods
in the phase of system requirements specification of the system development pro-
cess. Based on the characteristics of interlocking system requirements, a formal
framework should be developed. This framework provides the suitable mathemat-
ical concepts or specification languages to specify the interlocking logic formally.
In the mentioned projects, system models are difficult to be interpreted because of
the complexity of the specification languages. The chosen specification language
must be simple and it must be sufficient to specify requirements. Furthermore,
it is important to find out the incorrectness that might exist in informal system
requirements specifications. In the discussed projects, an important experience
is gained. In order to increase the involvements of railway engineers and their
confidence in applying mathematical specification languages at this stage of the
system development process, transformations of the formal specification into a se-
mantically equivalent (see Section 5.1.3 for the meaning of semantic equivalent)
form must be provided. Secondly, railway engineers must be able to specify and
check the correctness of the specified interlocking logic in the framework. In other
words, this formal framework must be engineering-oriented.
Chapter 4
The Engineering-Oriented Formal
Framework – Object-Based
Lastenheft
The characteristics of interlocking system requirements, the advantages of using
formal methods and the application of formal methods to the railway domains
have been discussed in the previous chapters. In this work, concepts are developed
to handle the discussed problems and are conceptualized into a formal framework
called Object-Based Lastenheft (OBLH). This framework is composed of a speci-
fication language, methods and an implemented tool. These components support
different professionals, especially railway engineers, to formally define and exam-
ine interlocking system requirements specifications. Furthermore, the developed
concepts are mathematically well-defined.
In this chapter, an overview on OBLH is first given in Section 4.1. The reasons
for developing the concepts and the advantages of applying them are elaborated
in detail in the remaining sections of this chapter.
4.1 An Overview on Object-Based Lastenheft
The main goal of this research work is to develop an engineering-oriented formal
framework that supports specification, analysis and verification of interlocking
system requirements specifications. Based on the described properties of an inter-
locking system requirements specification (see Section 2.3) and others experiences
of applying formal methods to the railway domain (see Section 3.2.4), a formal
framework called Object-Based Lastenheft (OBLH) is developed to achieve this
goal [HGE08]. The word ”Object-Based” means that every infrastructure element
(e.g. point) that belongs to a safe route is considered as an object and the object
consists of attributes (e.g. BHSS: The object is equipped with a movable frog
and in German: Das Element ist mit beweglicher Herzstu¨ckspitze ausgeru¨stet.).
While the word ”Lastenheft” stands for the ideas that each system requirement
of the specification is expressed by the objects’ attributes with the appropriate
mathematical specification language.
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In this framework, different types of system requirements (e.g. system require-
ments of the GUI) that have been expressed in [Tut06] are defined and the system
requirements can then be classified into the corresponding group based on the
definitions (see Section 4.2.1). An interlocking system requirements specification
becomes then well-structured.
Based on the study of the characteristics of the interlocking system require-
ments specification, the interlocking logic is generally defined by two types of
conditions in OBLH (see Section 4.2.2). They are static conditions and dynamic
conditions. The static conditions are used to describe the checking conditions or
constraints that the route, overlap and flank protection elements of a safe route
need to fulfill in the procedures of a safe route development and statuses of the
safe route. The dynamic conditions describe these procedures and statuses and
also their relationships. The focus of this research work is first put on supporting
specification and analysis of static conditions. The suitable mathematical specifi-
cation language to specify static conditions is propositional logic (see Section 5.1).
With the well-defined semantics and syntax of propositional logic, the checking
conditions and complex railway scenarios can be clearly and formally defined.
As it has been mentioned in Section 3.2.4, the specified formal model must
be understood by railway engineers and computer scientist easily. To express the
meaning or semantics of each propositional formula, truth tables [Hod77, HH02]
(see Section 5.1.2) and decision tables [Mon74, Har06, Hur82, Str77, Ju¨t89] (see
Section 5.2) are used. One of the reasons to use decision tables to represent the
semantics of propositional formulas is that decision tables are well known for their
simplicity to represent decision rules [GP95, Con79, VD94a, Van05, Lau65]. In
addition, propositional formulas and decision tables are semantically equivalent
[ZB99] (see Section 5.3). This transformation provides also a chance for the users
to check and inspect the correctness of the formally specified requirements (see
Section 4.3.1).
Decision tables are not only used to represent the meaning of propositional
formulas in OBLH. They can also be used to specify static conditions of the in-
terlocking logic and the safety requirements for checking the correctness of the
system requirements. The specified decision table must be well-formed. In order
to support the users in specifying the interlocking logic in a well-formed decision
table, the completeness w.r.t. the specified conditions of a decision table and the
consistency of rules of a decision table can be checked (see Section 4.3.3).
Some decision tables are composed of many rules if the defined system require-
ments are complex. To support analysis of a decision table, one can specify a
situation that needs to be evaluated w.r.t. the decision table. The evaluation re-
sult is then generated based on the defined rules in the decision table (see Section
4.3.2). For example, if the railway concept overlapping overlaps is defined in a
decision table, with a given situation (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 on page 20),
the evaluation result is generated.
Once the system requirements are syntactically well-defined based on the for-
mal specification language, finding inconsistencies, unclearness and checking cor-
rectness of the system requirements can be achieved by the defined mathematical
30 THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK – OBLH
concepts of the specification language (see Section 4.3.4). OBLH methods (meth-
ods 1 - 4) that are based on concepts of propositional logic and the properties of
interlocking system requirements specifications have been developed. Method 1 is
used to detect the inconsistency between two system requirements by comparing
their evaluations. Method 4 is used to check the correctness of system require-
ments by comparing the system requirements against the expected behavior of the
system or safety requirements. Method 2 and Method 3 are applied to specify
consistent and formal system requirements from the natural language written re-
quirements. In these two methods, the consistency of static conditions is achieved
by applying Method 1. All the OBLH methods are executed by using decision ta-
bles. With the usage of decision tables, railway engineers and computer scientists
can participate in the process of checking correctness and finding inconsistencies
of the system requirements.
As it has been mentioned in Section 3.1.1, mathematically well-defined con-
cepts and methods can be implemented as a program, such that the corresponding
mathematical operations are carried out by the program automatically. The stated
concepts and methods in OBLH are mathematically specified, therefore, a tool has
been implemented to support users in applying these methods and concepts. A
user guide of the OBLH tool can be found in Appendix E. The functions of this
tool are summarized as follows:
• Transformation of propositional formulas to decision tables or truth tables.
• Specification of the interlocking logic as well-formed propositional formulas
(see Section 5.1.1 for the meaning of well-formed propositional formulas).
• Specification of the interlocking logic in well-formed decision tables. Com-
pleteness w.r.t. the given conditions of a decision table and consistency
amongst rules of a decision table are examined.
• Comparison of system requirements (in form of a decision table or a propo-
sitional formula) with a given situation.
• Supporting specification, verification and analysis of interlocking system re-
quirements based on the defined steps in OBLH methods.
The above stated concepts are summarized as an activity diagram in Figure
4.1 on page 32. The process in this activity diagram (the left-most activity parti-
tion) indicates the usage of OBLH concepts to develop formal and correct system
requirements from a natural language written system requirements specification.
This process can also be used to develop new interlocking system requirements
specifications formally. The OBLH concepts that support this process are drawn
in four other activity partitions, for example, during the process, if system re-
quirements are defined in a well-formed propositional formula, this formula can
be transformed into a decision table for a better analysis. This is achieved by the
activity illustrated in the second-left activity partition.
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The mentioned concepts and methods will be further elaborated with given ex-
amples in detail in the following sections. The mathematical approaches of OBLH
methods and the mentioned concepts (e.g. the transformation of a propositional
formula to a decision table), the underlying technique that supports the implemen-
tation of concepts are discussed in Chapter 5. The introduction to propositional
logic and decision tables is also given in the same chapter.
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Figure 4.1: Applications of OBLH
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4.2 Specification in Object-Based Lastenheft
Specification in OBLH provides mechanisms to users to structure interlocking sys-
tem requirements specifications and to express these requirements explicitly and
formally.
In Section 4.2.1, the definitions of classification groups and the possible ad-
vantages of the classification are discussed. The specification of interlocking logic
in OBLH is discussed in Section 4.2.2 and the concepts of static conditions and
dynamic conditions are elaborated in more detail.
4.2.1 Classification of System Requirements
In interlocking system requirement specifications, some system requirements are
composed of specifications for different functionalities of an RIS, for example, a
system requirement could consist of specifications for the GUI and the interlocking
logic. However, such a composition is not clearly stated in this system requirement.
The problems have been discussed and illustrated by an Example (see Example 5
on page 13) in Section 2.3. In order to handle these problems, the possible groups
of interlocking system requirements are defined. System requirements can then be
classified into the corresponding groups in OBLH.
The groups of interlocking system requirements are listed as follows:
• Planning and projection: It defines the properties and attributes of safe
routes that the development teams need to consider and specify in the RIS
during the planning and projection of the system. The functionalities of the
interlocking logic are defined based on these properties and attributes. An
example of this type of system requirement is shown in Table 4.1.
No. System Requirement
2.1.2 Einzurichtende Merkmale fu¨r Zugstraßen
Folgende Merkmale der Zugstraße mu¨ssen durch Planung und Projek–
tierung eingerichtet sein, damit die Zulassungspru¨fung fu¨r diese Zug–
straße positiv sein kann:
– Zugstraßenstart
– Zugstraßenziel
– Durchrutschwegziel
– Fahrwegweichen
– Weichen des Durchrutschweges
Table 4.1: A system requirement for planning and projection
• GUI: It describes the graphical indication of a safe route and the correspond-
ing infrastructure elements on the GUI based on the statuses of the safe route
and the procedures of the safe route development. For example, Table 2.5
on page 13 states a requirement of this type. The requirement says if the
requested safe route fulfills all ZPZ conditions, then the band between the
start and the destination of this safe route must be shown in green color.
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• Interlocking logic: It expresses the logic of the RIS that the system develop-
ment teams need to implement in the RIS, such that safe routes are correctly
developed. System requirements of this type describe the procedures of a safe
route development, the statuses of a safe route, as well as the corresponding
checking conditions within these procedures and statuses. The interlock-
ing logic can be classified into two types: static conditions (see Table 4.3)
and dynamic conditions (see Table 4.2). They are further discussed in the
following section.
No. System Requirement
2.1.5 Negative Zulassungspru¨fung ZPZ
Bei negativer ZPZ wird die Eingabe des Bedieners abgewiesen.
Table 4.2: A system requirement for the interlocking logic, dynamic condition
With the classified system requirements, each development team can concen-
trate on its implementation based on the clearly defined specification. Wrong
interpretations and confusion can be avoided. The system development becomes
cost-effective by reducing the number of stated errors as in Example 5 on page 13
and discussions among development teams. Furthermore, the quality of verifica-
tion and the analysis of the correctness of the system requirements specification
are improved because of the completeness of the specification for comparisons.
4.2.2 Specification of Interlocking Logic
Among the groups of system requirements, the focus of this work has been put on
specifying the interlocking logic. The classifications of this logic are discussed in
Section 4.2.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.2, respectively.
4.2.2.1 Static Conditions
In OBLH, the defined procedures of a safe route development and statuses of a safe
route are both described as states of a safe route. The checking conditions that an
RIS needs to check within each state of the safe route are called static conditions.
Static conditions summarize all checking conditions that are specified from differ-
ent views or aspects (e.g. view of a safe route) and are defined by the attributes
of the infrastructure objects. Each of the chapters of the interlocking system re-
quirements specification defines such checking conditions. For example, Chapter
2 of [Tut06] defines the checking conditions for ZPZ, while Chapter 3 of [Tut06]
defines the checking conditions for moving points. As it has been mentioned be-
fore, these checking conditions are specified as statements or exceptionally allowed
scenarios in natural language. The statements can be related to safe routes as well
as route, overlap and flank protection elements of safe routes. For example, system
requirements for train couplings (German: Vereinigung von Zu¨gen) (see Table 2.2
on page 11), are described as scenarios.
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In OBLH, propositional logic is used to specify static conditions. This logic
supports definitions of declarative sentences and logical reasoning. Interlocking
system requirements specifications, like [Tut06], are composed of declarative sys-
tem requirements. Propositional logic is, therefore, well-suited to specify static
conditions. In the following example, a checking condition for moving points is
specified in propositional logic:
No. System requirement Propositional logic
3.2 Umstellbedingung fu¨r Weiche oder Kreuzung
im Fahrweg, D-Weg und im Flankenschutzraum
(a) Weichen und Kreuzungen im Fahrweg und
D-Weg sowie Flankenschutzweichen mu¨ssen frei sein (Frei ∧ (
und du¨rfen nicht in der Nicht-Solllage bzw. in der ¬(¬Solllage∧
Nicht-Schutzlage verschlossen oder gegen Umstellen (EL(v) ∧ Usp))))
gesperrt sein.
Table 4.3: The specification of system requirement 3.2(a)
Frei: The object of the requested safe route is free.
Das fu¨r die Fahrstraße beno¨tigte Element ist frei.
Usp: The object is a manually locking point.
Das Element ist gegen Umstellen gesperrt.
Before a point can be set to the requested position by an RIS, it must fulfill
the checking conditions that are defined in Chapter 3 of [Tut06]. One of these
checking conditions is specified in propositional logic in this example. This formula
(Frei∧ (¬(¬Solllage∧ (EL(v)∧Usp)))) ≡ (Frei∧ (Solllage∨¬(EL(v)∧Usp)))
means, a point can only be moved in the following two cases:
1. It is not occupied and is set in a proper position for the requested safe route.
2. It is not occupied and if it is not in a proper position for the requested safe
route, then it must not be locked for another safe route and not a manually
locking point.
Through the usage of propositional logic, these checking conditions are now
precisely stated and no ambiguity exists. There exists only one possible way of
interpreting this formula. Analysis of this formula can be carried out based on the
concepts of propositional logic (see Section 5.1). Furthermore, checking conditions
are easier to be understood because the logical structure of system requirements is
clearly elaborated without the usage of natural language. These advantages apply
also to the case of modeling checking conditions that are expressed as complex
railway scenarios.
The usage of propositional logic to specify static conditions of the interlock-
ing logic has been implemented in the OBLH tool. Users can specify the static
conditions as propositional formulas. To assist the formalization of propositional
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formulas, formulas that are not formalized based on the syntactic rules of propo-
sitional logic (see Section 5.1.1) will be indicated in the tool. In Figure 4.2, the
input formula is ∧Frei which is not well-formed 1 because ∧ is defined to be used
as a connective between two propositions.
Figure 4.2: Not well-formed propositional formula
Another form of defining a static condition in the OBLH tool are decision tables
(see Section 5.2). Static conditions are then specified by defining the conditions,
the rules and the corresponding action of each rule. The conditions must be
specified to the values Y, N or –. The symbol ’–’ means ’Don’t-care’, while the
actions must be evaluated to Y or N.
In the static condition (Frei ∧ (Solllage ∨ ¬(EL(v) ∧ Usp))), the attributes
Frei, Solllage, EL(v) and Usp are the conditions of the decision table. The rules
describe situations that must be considered under these system requirements. An
example of such a situation is that a point which belongs to the route of the
requested safe route is free and it is not in the proper position for the safe route.
This point is not locked for another safe route and not a manually locking point.
This situation is represented by R4 in the decision table in Figure 4.3. The action
of each rule is the evaluation of the situation. If the point satisfies this described
situation, then it is allowed to be moved. As a result, the action of R4 is evaluated
to Y.
1See page 109 for the meaning of symbols &, |, ∼ and =>.
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Figure 4.3: The specification of system requirement 3.2(a) in a decision table
As it has been illustrated in Figure 4.3, when a static condition of the interlock-
ing logic is specified in a decision table, the corresponding system requirements are
explicitly stated. It cannot lead to any misunderstanding. Furthermore, discus-
sions among different professions of the system development teams become more
productive because the system requirements are less difficult to be analyzed. With
the help of defined conditions and attributes of objects, the efficiency of the design
and the implementation process can be increased. Finally, with functions of check-
ing consistency and completeness w.r.t. the specified conditions of decision tables
in the OBLH tool (see Section 5.6.1 and Section 5.6.2), railway engineers can also
specify the interlocking logic formally without the help from formal experts. An-
other assistance for the specification of static conditions are the OBLH methods 2
and 3. The steps of these methods guide users in translating the natural language
written checking conditions to consistent static conditions of the state of a safe
route. These methods are further elaborated in Section 4.3.4.
A detailed definition of decision tables, the relationship between propositional
formulas and decision tables can be found in Chapter 5.
4.2.2.2 Dynamic Conditions
Dynamic conditions are used to define the possible states of a requested safe route
and the relationships between these states. As it has been mentioned above, the
interlocking logic in [Tut06] defines procedures of a safe route development and
possible statuses of a safe route. In OBLH, they are considered as the states of a
requested safe route. In the specification [Tut06], a number of states of safe routes
has been defined.
ZPZ positive (German: ZPZ positiv), FU¨MBli (German: Fahrstraßenfestlege-
u¨berwachungsmelder Blinklicht) and FU¨MR (German: Fahrstraßenfestlege-
u¨berwachungsmelder Ruhelicht) are some of the defined statuses of a safe route.
Static conditions are defined for these states, for example, when a requested safe
route reaches the state ZPZ positive, then route and overlap elements of the re-
quested safe route must be reserved for this requested safe route. In the specifi-
cation, the logic of the GUI is also defined for this type of states. For example, a
green band must be shown in the GUI of the train director when the safe route
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reaches the state ZPZ positive (see Table 2.5 on page 13). Via the definition of
safe route states, a relation between the logic of developing a safe route and the
logic of the GUI can then be defined.
Some procedures of a safe route development have been mentioned in the spec-
ification, in which an RIS applies the corresponding defined static conditions to
evaluate the infrastructure elements of the requested safe route, such that a re-
quested safe route can proceed to another state. For example, ZPZ is a procedure
of a safe route development. One of the static conditions of ZPZ is that each
element of the requested safe route is not allowed to be blocked for train move-
ments (see [S13, 2.2.2] in the specification [Tut06]). In this work, if the requested
safe route fulfills the static conditions of ZPZ, then the evaluation of ZPZ of this
requested safe route is said to be positive. If it does not fulfill these conditions,
then ZPZ of this requested safe route is said to be evaluated to be negative.
The relationships between these states define the life cycle of safe routes. In
other words, the previous and the next states of each state need to be defined. A
definition of these states answers the questions as follows:
• What is the state of the safe route before the checking conditions are applied?
• When an RIS is allowed to use the specific set of checking conditions to
evaluate a safe route?
• What is the following state of a safe route if it satisfies a specific set of
checking conditions?
• What is the following state of a safe route if it does not satisfy a specific set
of checking conditions?
The relationships of states that have been defined in Chapters 2 and 3 of the
specification [Tut06] are shown in Table 4.4. UMBP is the abbreviation of the
German phrase, Pru¨fung der Umstellbedingungen. The English meaning of this
word is the examination of the checking conditions for moving points.
Based on this analysis of Table 4.4, some ambiguous interpretations of the
states of a safe route exist in the specification. For example, the next state of
the requested safe route is not defined if a point of the route does not fulfill the
corresponding conditions for moving points. It is also uncertain in which states
of the safe route a point is set to the requested position. The implementation
team can implement an interlocking system where a point of a safe route is set
without checking static conditions that have been defined for ZPZ because the
corresponding states’ relations have not been clearly defined in the specification.
However, this implementation might not satisfy the safety requirements of safe
route development or the expected behavior of the RIS. If the expected behavior
of the RIS is to set a point of the requested safe route after ZPZ of this route is
evaluated to be positive, then this implementation error can only be found during
the later phases of the system development process. This costs time and resources.
In fact, an interlocking system requirements specification is written in the early
phase of a system development, less implementation or design issues should be in-
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Chapter Defined State Previous State Next State
2 ZPZ RIS commences to The static
ZPZ when the conditions of ZPZ are
command of devel- fulfilled: ZPZ positive
oping a safe not fulfilled: ZPZ negative
route is input
ZPZ positive ZPZ -
ZPZ negative ZPZ -
3 UMBP for - The static conditions are
points located fulfilled: -
within the route not fulfilled: -
UMBP for points - The static conditions are
points located fulfilled: -
within the overlap not fulfilled: -
UMBP for - The static conditions are
points provide fulfilled: -
flank protection not fulfilled: -
Table 4.4: Defined states of a safe route in LH-ESTW-R
cluded, such that enough freedom is provided to the corresponding system develop-
ment teams to match their techniques for building an RIS, for example, choosing
the sequence for setting the route, overlap and flank protection elements of the
safe route in the proper position after the result of ZPZ is evaluated to be posi-
tive. However, any unclearness of dynamic conditions which are related to safety
requirements shall not happen in system requirements of safety critical systems,
like RIS.
The formal specification language for defining dynamic conditions has not been
investigated in this work. This formal specification language must satisfy the
following requirements:
1. A mechanism to define the states of safe routes must be provided. The
states’ relationships that are related to safety requirements must be clearly
expressed, such that the design or implementation of an RIS satisfies these
requirements. This reduces the number of errors that need to be amended
in the later phases of the system development process.
2. It is possible to specify implementation or design issues that are not related
to safety requirements, in such a way that certain design’s freedom is given
to system developing companies to suit their technology. And unclear inter-
pretations must be avoided at the same time.
3. A mechanism to find inconsistencies in the dynamic conditions must also be
provided. For example, an overlapping overlap is allowed in ZPZ. The static
conditions of FU¨MR must also state that if the reserved point is without a
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movable frog and the requested overlap is a trailing point movement, then
the point needs not to be locked. Otherwise, this requested overlap cannot
be developed.
4. The modeling language must be easily understood and suitable to be applied
by engineers.
One of the possible specification languages for defining dynamic conditions are
state machines [EW00, Dou99]. State machines are a design-oriented modeling
language [Mil06]. Many implementation issues need to be well-defined in a state
machine [Hon06]. However, only one from many different implementation choices
can be expressed in a state machine, for example, the sequence of setting the
route, overlap and flank protection elements in a proper position for the requested
safe route. An RIS can be implemented to set the corresponding elements in a
sequence or to set them all at the same time in parallel. And only one of them
can be expressed in a state machine. If a state machine is used as the specifi-
cation tool in this early stage of the system development, system designers will
automatically use the defined sequences of the state machine for the design of the
system. An interlocking system requirements specification is written with an in-
tention to leave design issues open. Therefore, using a state machine for specifying
an interlocking system requirements specification is not suitable. Furthermore, to
check the correctness of a state machine, one needs to define safety requirements in
temporal logic. However, specification of safety requirements in temporal logic is
easily prone to error [Bit02]. It is also uncertain, whether the existing verification
methods of state machines can check the mentioned inconsistencies of interlocking
system requirements.
Since the specification of dynamic conditions is still under investigation, no
corresponding supportive function has been defined and implemented in the OBLH
tool.
4.3 Analysis and Verification in Object-Based
Lastenheft
The target users of this formal framework are not only formal experts and computer
scientists, but also railway engineers. Therefore, a number of ideas is designed to
assist different users to apply the concepts of this framework.
These ideas are elaborated in this section, the transformation of formulas and
situational analysis in OBLH are first introduced. The function of checking com-
pleteness w.r.t. the given conditions of a decision table and consistency of a decision
table is then elaborated. Checking the correctness of formal interlocking system
requirements and the developed OBLH methods are discussed in the final section.
4.3.1 Transformation of Formulas
The importance of writing precise interlocking system requirements specifications
has been discussed in different chapters of this thesis. In Section 4.2.2.1, it has
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been explained that applying propositional logic to specify static conditions of the
interlocking logic can achieve this goal.
However, from the experience of applying formal methods to railway domains,
specifying the interlocking logic in formal logics, like propositional formulas, is not
sufficient to increase the simplicity in apprehending the requirements. Therefore, it
is important to provide a chance for team members from different backgrounds to
interpret the formally specified system requirements. Another goal of this work is
to investigate a semantically equivalent and simple form to represent the meaning
of propositional formulas. Railway engineers and computer scientists must be able
to utilize and read the chosen form of representation without putting much effort
to learn it.
Truth table and Decision tables are used to represent the meaning of propo-
sitional formulas. The concept of transformations (see Section 5.5.1) and the
implementation technique are mathematically well-defined (see Section 5.4), they
are implemented in the OBLH tool. In Figure 4.4, the formal specification of re-
quirement 1.7 (¬DWEL(v)∨Solllage∨ (¬Spitz ∧¬BHSS)), is transformed to a
decision table (see Figure 4.4) and a truth table (see Figure 4.5 on page 42).
Figure 4.4: The specification of system requirement 1.7 in a decision table
By using the OBLH tool, the propositional formula can be transformed into
a decision table, the meaning of the formula can therefore be easily interpreted
by different professions in the same way. With this function, complex system
requirements in natural language can be well understood in the form of decision
tables.
In Section 3.2.4, a number of reasons for the low acceptance of formal methods
in the railway domain has been stated. One of them is that railway engineers are
not provided with any support to examine formally defined mathematical models.
In the OBLH tool, railway engineers can examine a formally defined propositional
formula, therefore, their confidence of using formal methods is then increased.
Railway engineers can also be involved more in analyzing formal system require-
ment specifications.
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Figure 4.5: The specification of system requirement 1.7 in a truth table
4.3.2 Situational Analysis
Apart from the transformation of propositional formulas to decision tables, there
is another way to support analysis of a propositional formula or the corresponding
decision table in OBLH. It is the situational analysis.
The idea of this function originates from the working experience with railway
engineers. It is common among railway engineers to check whether a given situa-
tion satisfies the specified interlocking logic in the interlocking system requirements
specification during their work. In other words, the fulfillment of the situation to
the system requirements is checked. Normally, the analysis is achieved by first
reading the system requirements and then evaluating the situation. For example,
given the situation in Figure 2.7 on page 13, railway engineers evaluate whether
ZPZ of the requested overlap DWegZ2 is positive.
In OBLH, static conditions of the interlocking logic are expressed in proposi-
tional formulas or decision tables. The evaluation of a situation w.r.t. a system
requirement can then be achieved by analyzing the defined formula (see Figure
3.1). Another way is to transform the formula into a decision table. Then, one
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searches the rule which describes the given situation and the action of this rule
is then the evaluation of the situation. This idea is further elaborated in OBLH
and the fulfillment of a given situation w.r.t. the system requirements is checked
by applying the mathematical concept. This concept will be further elaborated
in Section 5.1. The defined operation is also implemented in the OBLH tool (see
Section 5.6.3).
The analyses in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 can be obtained by using the OBLH
tool. They are illustrated in Figure 4.6 on page 44, Figure 4.7 on page 44, Figure
4.8 on page 45, and Figure 4.9 on page 45, respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Specification of the situation in Figure 3.1 Figure 4.7: Situation analysis of the situation in Figure 3.1
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Figure 4.8: Specification of the situation in Figure 3.2 Figure 4.9: Situation analysis of the situation in Figure 3.2
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With the help of the situational analysis in the OBLH tool, railway engineers
and computer scientists can examine situations and the system requirements or
railway concepts quickly.
4.3.3 Completeness and Consistency of Decision Tables
In those projects mentioned in Section 3.2, the formal models and expected behav-
ior of the system are rarely defined by railway engineers. To increase the partici-
pation of railway engineers in specification and verification, railway engineers can
specify the interlocking logic or expected behavior of the system for checking the
correctness of system requirements formally in decision tables in the OBLH tool.
These decision tables must satisfy the formal definition of decision tables that is
given in Section 5.2.
Based on this definition, a decision table is said to be well-formed in OBLH
if it is complete and the specified rules are consistent among each other. Formal
definitions of these two properties are given in Section 5.2.2. Informally speaking,
if a decision table is used to define a static condition of the interlocking logic and
this decision table is incomplete w.r.t. the given conditions, then some situations
that need to be evaluated under the system requirement are missing. The decision
table in Figure 4.10 defines the requirement 1.7. It is incomplete because a number
of possible situations are missing. As a result, some of the situations like the one
described in Figure 2.7 on page 13 cannot be evaluated based on this decision
table.
Figure 4.10: An incomplete specification in a decision table
Another important property is the consistency of a decision table. If there are
two rules that have the same combination of conditions’ values and their evalua-
tions are different in a decision table, then these two rules are said to be inconsistent
among each other. For example, the rule R4 and R6 of the decision table in Figure
4.11 on page 47 are not consistent to each other. They describe the same situation,
but their evaluation results are different.
In order to support users to define well-formed decision tables, functions for
checking consistency and completeness w.r.t. the defined conditions of a decision
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Figure 4.11: An inconsistent specification in a decision table
table are mathematically defined and implemented in the OBLH tool (see Section
5.6.2 and Section 5.6.1). The steps for checking the completeness and consistency
of decision tables in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 on page 47 by the OBLH tool are
illustrated in Figure 4.12 on page 47 and 4.14, respectively. Figure 4.13 on page
48 and Figure 4.15 on page 49 show the results.
Figure 4.12: Checking the completeness of a decision table in Figure 4.10
48 THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK – OBLH
Figure 4.13: The result of the completeness analysis of Figure 4.12
Figure 4.14: Checking the consistency of a decision table in Figure 4.11
With the functions of checking consistency and completeness w.r.t. the specified
conditions of decision tables in the OBLH tool, railway engineers are provided with
the chance and support to specify the interlocking logic and safety requirements
for verification formally and correctly.
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Figure 4.15: The result of the consistency analysis of Figure 4.14
4.3.4 Methods for Specification, Analysis and Verification
Some of the benefits to specify the interlocking system requirements formally based
on the concepts of OBLH have been shown in the above sections. Another ad-
vantage is that one can apply OBLH methods to specify, analyze and verify the
interlocking logic of an interlocking system requirements specification which is
written in a natural language, like [Tut06] or analyze and verify a newly defined
one in the OBLH tool. Since the current work concentrates on specifying the static
conditions of the interlocking logic, the defined methods are designed to support
specification, analysis and verification of system requirements of this type.
The functions of each method are briefly listed as follows:
• Method 1: It is a basic method of the OBLH methods. It is used to check
the possible unclearness and inconsistency of two system requirements by
comparing their evaluation results.
Methods 2, 3 and 4 define usages of method 1 based on their specific context.
Method 2 and Method 3 are used to obtain consistent and formal system require-
ments from a specification that is written in a natural language. Method 4 is used
to check the correctness of formal system requirements.
• Method 2: To summarize in natural language written checking conditions
specified within one view (e.g. ZPZ conditions for a safe route and in Ger-
man: ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die gesamte Zugfahrstraße) into a consistent
well-formed formula or well-formed decision table.
• Method 3: To obtain the consistent static conditions of a state of the safe
route (e.g. ZPZ) from in natural language written checking conditions that
are defined in two different views (e.g. ZPZ conditions for a safe route, ZPZ
conditions for an infrastructure object located within the route and in Ger-
man: ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die gesamte Zugfahrstraße, ZPZ-Bedingungen je
Fahrwegelement im Fahrweg).
• Method 4: To verify the correctness of system requirements by comparing
them with the expected behavior or safety requirements of the system.
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Each of these methods is first elaborated and examples are given to illustrate
the steps of each method. The methods are elaborated in detail as follows:
Method 1
Given two system requirements that define similar or the same concepts, incon-
sistency and unclearness might exist among the requirements. In other words,
the evaluation results of these two system requirements over the same situation
are different (See Example 9 on page 52). The different evaluations between two
system requirements are found by the following steps:
1. Given the system requirements expressed in the forms of well-formed decision
tables or well-formed propositional formulas.
2. If system requirements (from step 1) are defined as well-formed formulas,
then transform the formulas to decision tables by using the OBLH tool (e.g.
DT1 and DT2).
3. Use the OBLH tool to compare these decision tables by checking whether
those situations that are evaluated to Y in DT1, are also evaluated to Y in
DT2 (DT1 |= DT2)2. The inconsistent evaluations between the decision
tables are indicated in a resulting decision table that is produced by the
OBLH tool. In this decision table, those rules with the action value N indicate
these differences. Users analyze this result.
4. Use the OBLH tool to compare these decision tables by checking whether
those situations that are evaluated to Y in DT2, are also evaluated to Y in
DT1 (DT2 |= DT1)3. The different evaluations between the decision tables
are indicated in a resulting decision table that is produced by the OBLH
tool. In this decision table, those rules with the action value N indicate these
differences. Users analyze this result.
Method 2
Method 2 is applied to summarize the system requirements (checking conditions
of a safe route) into a consistent well-formed formula or well-formed decision ta-
ble within one view or aspect. The system requirements within one view must
be fulfilled by the infrastructure elements of the requested safe route. These sys-
tem requirements consists of the logical and relationship among each other (see
Example 10 on page 56).
1. Translate each system requirement (from the set of requirements) which is
written in natural language into a well-formed formula or well-formed deci-
sion table.
2Mathematically, checking whether the admissible situations under a specification
Specification1, are also admissible under another specification Specification2, is defined as
Specification1 |= Specification2. See Section 5.1.3 for a detailed elaboration.
3The reason of this comparison is given formally in Section 5.1.3.
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2. During the translation, if there exists a common attribute in two system
requirements and these requirements have the logical and relationship, then
it is important to analyze whether inconsistent specifications exist among
these two requirements.
3. The analysis of two requirements can be achieved by using Method 1. Choose
one of the requirements as a basis and correct the corresponding differences
between the system requirements based on the result of the analysis from
Method 1.
Method 3
1. Specify the consistent well-formed propositional formulas or well-formed de-
cision tables, respectively, of each view based on Method 2.
2. Compare the consistent well-formed propositional formulas or well-formed
decision tables, respectively, of the two different views based on Method 1.
Method 4
The interlocking logic of system requirements defines all the admissible situations
in which a safe route can be issued, developed and released. They must also be
specified to be admissible in safety requirements or the expected behavior of the
system (see Example 12 on page 63). This can be achieved by the following steps:
1. Given the system requirements and checking conditions for verification (e.g.
safety requirements) in well-formed decision tables or well-formed proposi-
tional formulas, respectively.
2. If system requirements or checking conditions for verification are defined as
formulas, then transform the formulas to decision tables by using the OBLH
tool (e.g. DT1 defines system requirements and DT2 specify the checking
conditions for verification).
3. Use the OBLH tool to compare these decision tables by checking whether
those situations that are evaluated to Y in DT1, are also evaluated to Y
in DT2 (DT1 |= DT2). The differences between the decision tables are
indicated in a resulting decision table that is produced by the OBLH tool.
In this decision table, those rules with the action value N indicate these
differences. Users analyze this result.
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Examples to illustrate the applications of OBLH methods are provided in the
following:
Example 9
Example 4 on page 12 shows that ZPZ conditions for evaluating overlapping
overlaps are defined in the system requirement 2.2.1 and system requirement 2.4.1
of [Tut06]. It is then important to analyze whether the evaluation results of
the same situation under these two different system requirements are the same.
Method 1 can be used to find out the differences. The steps are then illustrated
in this example as follows:
1. The system requirements are first translated to propositional formulas:
Requirement2.2.1 ≡ DWEL(b)→ (Solllage ∨ (¬BHSS ∧ ¬Spitz))
Requirement2.4.1 ≡ ¬BHSS → (Solllage∨
(¬Usp ∧ ¬(FWEL(b) ∨DWEL(b) ∨ FLEL(b))))
FWEL(b): The object is locked or reserved as a route element of
other routes.
Das Element ist als Fahrwegelement fu¨r eine andere
Fahrstraße beansprucht.
DWEL(b): The object is locked or reserved as an overlap element of
other routes.
Das Element is als DWeg-Element (DW≥0) fu¨r
eine oder mehrere Zugstraßen beansprucht.
FLEL(b): The object is locked or reserved as a flank protection
element of other routes.
Das Element ist als Flankenschutzelement fu¨r eine oder
mehrere Fahrstraßen beansprucht.
2. The formulas are transformed to decision tables in the OBLH tool. Figure
4.16 shows the decision table of Requirement2.4.1 (DT1) and the decision
table of Requirement2.2.1 (DT2).
3. The decision table of the system requirement 2.2.1 (DT2) is then checked
against the decision table of the system requirement 2.4.1 (DT1). This step
analyzes whether there exists a situation in which ZPZ of the requested over-
lapDWegZx is evaluated to be positive under the definition ofRequirement2.2.1,
while it is considered to be negative under the specification ofRequirement2.4.1.
Figure 4.16 shows the result of Requirement2.2.1 |= Requirement2.4.1. The
resulting decision table DT4 contains four rules which indicate the inconsis-
tent evaluations between Requirement2.2.1 and Requirement2.4.1. The anal-
ysis of this result is written as follows:
a. R4 of DT4: the corresponding rule in DT1 is R4 and in DT2 it is R4.
R4 of DT2 indicates that overlapping overlaps are allowed based on
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Requirement2.2.1 and they are not allowed in DT1. R4 of DT1 denotes
that if an object is not set in a proper position for DWegZx (¬Solllage)
and it is locked or reserved as an overlap element (DWEL(b)), then ZPZ
of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative. This indicates that no over-
lapping overlap is allowed under the specification of Requirement2.2.4.
It is then unclear whether overlapping overlaps are permissible in the
specification [Tut06].
b. R7 of DT4: the corresponding rule in DT1 is R3 and in DT2 it is R5.
R3 of DT1 indicates that if an object within DWegZx is a manually
locking point (Usp) and it is already set in an improper position, then
ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative, while no statement has
been specified for this situation in Requirement2.2.1. Therefore it is
unclear, whether ZPZ of DWegZx should be evaluated to be positive or
negative under this situation. One should then analyze this situation
and decide whether this situation should be admissible or not.
c. R8 of DT4: the corresponding rule in DT1 is R5 and in DT2 it is R5.
R5 of DT1 does not allow a point which is in an improper position
for DWegZx (¬Solllage) and is locked or reserved as a route element
of another safe route (FWEL(b)). However, Requirement2.2.1 did not
specify whether the evaluation ZPZ of DWegZx should be positive or
negative in this situation. Therefore, one should analyze the situation
and decide whether this situation should be allowed or not.
d. R10 of DT4: the corresponding rule in DT1 is R6 and in DT2 it is R5.
R6 of DT1 does not allow a point which is in an improper position
for DWegZx (¬Solllage) and is locked or reserved as a flank protec-
tion element of another safe route (FLEL(b)). However, the system
requirement 2.2.1 did not specify whether ZPZ of DWegZx should be
evaluated to be positive or negative in this situation. Therefore, one
should analyze this situation and decide the corresponding evaluation
of ZPZ of DWegZx.
4. The decision table of the system requirement 2.4.1 (DT1) is then checked
against the decision table of the system requirement 2.2.1 (DT2). This step
analyzes whether there exists a situation in which ZPZ of the requested over-
lapDWegZx is evaluated to be positive under the definition ofRequirement2.4.1,
while it is considered to be negative under the specification ofRequirement2.2.1.
Figure 4.17 shows the result of Requirement2.4.1 |= Requirement2.2.1. The
resulting decision table DT3 contains a rule which indicates the inconsistent
evaluation between Requirement2.4.1 and Requirement2.2.1. The analysis of
this result is written as follows:
R2 of DT3: the corresponding rule in DT1 is R1 and in DT2 it is R2.
R2 of DT2 indicates that if the point is equipped with a movable frog it
is not set in a proper position for DWegZx (¬Solllage) and it is locked for
another safe route as an overlap element (DWEL(b)). Therefore, it does not
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Figure 4.16: Consistency analysis of Requirement2.2.1 |= Requirement2.4.1
fulfill ZPZ conditions under the specification of Requirement2.2.1. However,
Requirement 2.4.1 denotes that this situation is allowed. In the natural
language written requirement 2.4.1, no requirements have been specified for
a point which is equipped with a movable frog in this example. Because of
the translation of this requirement into a logical formula it is unclear whether
ZPZ of DWegZx should be evaluated to be positive or negative. Therefore,
one should analyze the situation and decide whether this situation should be
allowed or not. ZPZ conditions for a point with a movable frog are specified
in the system requirement 2.4.2 of [Tut06]. It indicates that this situation is
not allowed.
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Figure 4.17: Consistency analysis of Requirement2.4.1 |= Requirement2.2.1
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Example 10
To illustrate the concept of Method 2, developing the checking conditions of ZPZ
to evaluate a requested overlap within a view (view of a safe route) is shown in this
example. For reasons of simplicity, only system requirements 2.2.1 and 2.2.1(a) of
the specification are used.
1. The first part of the system requirement 2.2.1 and system requirement 2.2.1(a)
are specified as a formula Requirement2.2.1Part1 and Requirement2.2.1a in ta-
ble 4.5.
No. System requirement Static condition
2.2 ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die gesamte
Zugfahrstraße
2.2.1 Grundsatz fu¨r ZPZ
Im Bereich Start - Ziel - DWeg-Ziel darf keine
Auflo¨sesto¨rung vorgelegen haben,
es darf also kein Fahrwegelement ¬FWEL(b) ∧ ¬DWEL(b)∧
(FW-EL) noch fu¨r eine andere Fahrstraße (FLEL(b)→ Solllage)
verschlossen sein.
Es darf keine Zielfestlegung oder ein nicht
aufgelo¨stes DWeg-Ziel vorhanden sein.
Es gelten aber folgende Ausnahmen:
a) Durchfahrt
Bei einer Durchfahrt (gleichzeitige Stellung FWEL(b)→ (
einer Einfahrzugstrae und einer Ausfahr Solllage ∧ EL(Durchfahrt))
zugstraße) darf Im Bereich Ziel - D-Weg-
Ziel darf eine unmittelbar an das Zielsignal
anschließende Zugstraße vorhanden sein.
Table 4.5: The specification of system requirements 2.2.1 and 2.2.1(a)
EL(Durchfahrt): The locking or reservation belongs to a part
of the requested non-stop safe route
Nutzung geho¨rt zu einem Teil der einzustellenden
Durchfahrt
2. The formulaRequirement2.2.1a (Requirement2.2.1a ≡ FEWL(b)→ (Solllage∧
EL(Durchfahrt))) consists of an attribute FWEL(b) that has been used
in the formula Requirement2.2.1Part1 (Requirement2.2.1Part1 ≡ ¬FWEL(b)∧
¬DWEL(b) ∧ (FLEL(b) → Solllage)). These formulas contain the logical
and relationship. Therefore it is important to analyze these two formulas by
using Method 1.
3. Both formulas are transformed to decision tables in the OBLH tool. DT5
and DT6 in Figure 4.18 are the decision tables of Requirement2.2.1Part1 and
Requirement2.2.1a, respectively.
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4. The decision table of Requirement2.2.1Part1 (DT5) is first checked against
the decision table of Requirement2.2.1a (DT6). This step analyzes whether
there exists a situation in which ZPZ of the requested overlap DWegZx is
evaluated to be positive in DT5, while it is considered to be negative in DT6.
Figure 4.18 shows the result of Requirement2.2.1Part1 |= Requirement2.2.1a.
The resulting decision table DT7 contains one rules. The action of this rule
is evaluated to Y. This means, no situation is evaluated to be admissible
under Requirement2.2.1Part1, while it is evaluated to be inadmissible under
the specification of Requirement2.2.1(a).
Figure 4.18: Consistency analysis of Requirement2.2.1Part1 |= Requirement2.2.1a
5. The decision table of Requirement2.2.1a (DT6) is checked against the de-
cision table of Requirement2.2.1Part1 (DT5). This step analyzes whether
there exists a situation in which ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be positive
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in DT6, while it is considered to be negative in DT5. Figure 4.19 shows
the result of Requirement2.2.1a |= Requirement2.2.1Part1. The resulting de-
cision table DT8 contains four rules which indicate inconsistent evaluations
between Requirement2.2.1 and Requirement2.2.1Part1. The analysis of this
result is written as follows:
a. R1 of DT8: the corresponding rule in DT5 is R1 and in DT6 it is R1. R1
of DT5 indicates that if the object within DWegZx is already locked or
reserved as a route element of another safe route (FWEL(b)), then ZPZ
of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative. However, the requested safe
route is a part of the non-stop route (the entrance route), this object
can be locked or reserved for another part of the non-stop route (the
exit route). This situation is evaluated to be positive in R1 of DT6. In
other words, a non-stop route cannot be developed by using DT5.
b. R4 and R6 of DT8: the corresponding rule in DT5 is R2 and in DT6
it is R4. R2 of DT5 indicates that if the object within DWegZx is
already locked or reserved as an overlap element of another safe route
(DWEL(b)), then ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative. Since
no declaration of this situation has been made in Requirement2.2.1a it is
unclear whether ZPZ of DWegZx should be evaluated to be positive or
negative in this situation, one should analyze this situation and decide
on the corresponding evaluation of ZPZ of DWegZx.
c. R8 of DT8: the corresponding rule in DT5 is R4 and in DT6 it is R4. R4
of DT5 indicates that if the object within DWegZx is already locked or
reserved as a flank protection element of another safe route (FLEL(b))
and it is set in an improper position for DWegZx (¬Solllage), then ZPZ
of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative. The corresponding evaluation
of ZPZ of DWegZx must be decided based on the result of an analysis.
6. Based on the above differences, the decision table of Requirement2.2.1Part1 is
chosen as the basis of the correction. The result is shown in Figure 4.20.
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Figure 4.19: Consistency analysis of Requirement2.2.1a |= Requirement2.2.1Part1
Figure 4.20: The correct decision table
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Example 11
Method 3 is used to specify the consistent static conditions of the interlocking
logic. In this example, parts of the steps in developing the static condition of ZPZ
for evaluating the requested overlap DWegZx are illustrated as follows:
1. The formulas of each view are developed based on Method 2 and they are
specified as follows:
ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße ≡ (FWEL(b)→ (Solllage ∧ EL(Durchfahrt)))
∧(DWEL(b)→ (Solllage ∨ (¬BHSS∧
¬Spitz))) ∧ (FL(b)→ Solllage) ∧ ¬Bsp
(EL(Durchfahrt)→ (FWEL(b)∧
¬DWEL(b)))
ZPZDWegElement ≡ Solllage ∨ (¬Usp ∧ ¬(FWEL(b) ∨DWEL(b)
∨FLEL(b))) ∧ (EL(Durchfahrt)→
(FWEL(b) ∧ ¬DWEL(b)))
Bsp: The object is blocked for train movements.
Eine Befahrbarkeitssperre ist gesetzt.
ZPZDwegElement: The evaluation ZPZ conditions of the requested
overlap is positive (based on the ZPZ
conditions in the view of an object).
ZPZ des einzustellenden DWeg ist positiv
(nach den ZPZ-Bedingungen auf der Ebene
”Fahrwegelement im Durchrutschweg”).
ZPZDwegGesamtzugstraße: The evaluation ZPZ conditions of the requested
overlap is positive (based on the ZPZ
conditions in the view of a safe route).
ZPZ des einzustellenden DWeg ist positiv
(nach den ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die Ebene
”gesamte Zugfahrstraße”).
2. The formulas are transformed to decision tables in the OBLH tool as it is
shown in Figure 4.21. DT8 and DT9 are the decision tables of
ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße
4 and ZPZDWegElement, respectively.
3. The decision table of ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße (DT8) is checked against the
decision table of ZPZDWegElement (DT9). This step analyzes whether there
exists a situation in which ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be positive in
DT8, while it is considered to be negative in DT9. Figure 4.21 shows the
result of ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße |= ZPZDWegElement. The resulting deci-
sion table DT10 contains two rules which indicate inconsistent evaluations
4(EL(Durchfahrt)→ (FWEL(b)∧¬DWEL(b))) is not a defined system requirement of the
specification [Tut06], it is defined in this work for the purpose of mathematical specifications,
such that physically this impossible situation is defined. The evaluation result of this situation
must not be admissible. In other words, the corresponding rule of the decision table must have
the action value N (see Section 6).
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Figure 4.21: Consistency analysis of ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße and ZPZDWegElement
between ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße and ZPZDWegElement. The analysis of this
result is written as follows:
a. R7 of DT10: the corresponding rule in DT8 is R17 and in DT9 it is
R2. R2 of DT9 denotes that if an object is not in a proper position
for DWegZx (¬Solllage) and it is locked or reserved as an overlap el-
ement (DWEL(b)), then ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative.
However, R17 of DT8 indicates that if this object is equipped with-
out a movable frog and the train movement of DWegZx is a trailing
point movement, then ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be positive. In
other words, this type of overlapping overlaps cannot be developed un-
der the specification of ZPZDWegElement. It is then ambiguous whether
overlapping overlaps are permissible in the specification [Tut06].
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b. R12 of DT10: the corresponding rule in DT8 is R2 and in DT9 it is
R15. R15 of DT9 indicates that if the object within DWegZx is a
manually locking point (Usp) and it is set in an improper position for
DWegZx, then ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative. Since no
declaration of this situation has been made in ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße it
is unclear whether ZPZ of DWegZx should be evaluated to be positive or
negative in this situation under this specification, one should analyze the
situation and decide the corresponding evaluation of ZPZ of DWegZx.
4. Based on the analysis of the result of the comparison, DT8 is chosen as the
basis of correction and the corrected decision table is shown in Figure 4.22.
5. The next step is to compare the decision table of ZPZDWegElement (DT9)
with the decision table of ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße (DT8). The principle of
applying this method has been demonstrated in this example, the result of
ZPZDWegElement |= ZPZDWegGesamtzugstraße is not further discussed in this
thesis5.
Figure 4.22: The correct decision table
5The result of this step has been produced and discussed in a project for the German Rail
(German: Deutsche Bahn) [HGS09].
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Example 12
As it has been mentioned above, in Method 4, the system requirements are
checked against the expected behavior of system requirements or safety require-
ments. It is only important to check whether those situations which are evaluated
to be admissible under the system requirements, are also admitted under the ex-
pected behavior of the system. Therefore, Method 4 can be applied. The steps
of applying Method 4 for the verification are then illustrated in this example as
follows:
1. The system requirement 2.2.1 is specified as a formula Requirement2.2.1 (see
Example 9 on page 52 for the definition of the formula) and the expected
behavior Requirement2.2.1ExpectedBehavior is defined in a decision table DT3
(see Figure 4.23).
Figure 4.23: The expected behavior of the system requirement 2.2.1
2. Requirement2.2.1 is transformed to a decision table DT2 with the OBLH
tool.
3. The decision table of the system requirement 2.2.1 (DT2) is verified against
the decision table of the expected behavior (DT3). This step analyzes
whether there exists a situation in which the evaluation of ZPZ for the re-
quested overlap DWegZx is evaluated to be positive under the specification
of Requirement2.2.1, while it is considered to be negative under the expected
behavior. Figure 4.24 shows the result of Requirement2.2.1 |=
Requirement2.2.1ExpectedBehavior. The resulting decision table DT4 contains
a rule which indicates the inconsistent evaluation between Requirement2.2.1
and the expected behavior of this requirement. The analysis of this result is
written as follows:
R4 of DT4: the corresponding rule in DT2 is R4 and in DT3 it is R4.
R4 of DT3 indicates that if the point within DWegZx is not in a proper
position (¬Solllage) and it is locked as an overlap element for another safe
route, then ZPZ of DWegZx is evaluated to be negative independent of the
construction of this point (e.g. with or without a movable frog). However,
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under Requirement2.2.1, this situation can be evaluated to be positive if the
point is not equipped with a movable frog (¬BHSS). Therefore, there is a
situation in which the evaluation result is different under Requirement2.2.1
and the expected behavior.
Figure 4.24: Verification of the system requirement 2.2.1 against expected behavior
When the system requirements that are written in a natural language or newly
defined system requirements specifications are expressed in the forms of decision
tables or propositional formulas, the correctness of interlocking system require-
ments specifications that can be checked with the OBLH methods. Inconsisten-
cies of specifications that have been mentioned in Section 2.3 can be discovered.
Furthermore, the formal static conditions can be verified against the expected be-
havior of the system and safety requirements, such that the costs of amending
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the corresponding discovered incorrectness can be reduced. As it has been shown,
railway engineers can also participate in checking the correctness of these system
requirements with the usage of decision tables.
Chapter 5
Formal Logics in Object-Based
Lastenheft
Concepts of OBLH to support specification, analysis and verification of the in-
terlocking system requirements have been discussed informally in the previous
chapter. In this chapter, these concepts are modeled and defined mathemati-
cally by propositional logic, such that they can be well understood and correctly
implemented. The suitable technique is found to implement these mathematical
operations as a program. In this work, the technique Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams (OBDDs) is used.
In this chapter, an introduction to propositional logic is given in Section 5.1.
Decision tables are an important form of representing the meaning of interlocking
system requirements in OBLH. Therefore, a formal definition of decision tables in
OBLH is given in Section 5.2. The relationships between propositional logic, deci-
sion tables and the OBDDs technique are elaborated in Section 5.3. The OBDDs
technique is formally introduced in Section 5.4. The algorithms to implement the
OBLH concepts with this technique are then described in Section 5.5 and Section
5.6.
5.1 Introduction to Propositional Logic
It has been mentioned in Chapter 4 that propositional logic is one of the classical
logics to model declarative statements and to assist reasoning [HR04]. In mathe-
matics, each formal specification language comprises two components: syntax and
semantics. The syntax includes the definition of notations that can be used in the
logic and deduction rules to manipulate the notations. The semantics defines the
meaning of notations. With the well-defined semantics and syntax of the logic,
making conclusions from stated facts can be achieved. Syntactically, reasoning is
achieved by applying the deduction rules of the logic among the conclusions and
facts. Semantically, they are carried out by comparing the meaning of the facts
and the conclusions.
The syntax and semantics of propositional logic are briefly introduced in Sec-
tion 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2. Reasoning in propositional logic is then discussed in
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Section 5.1.3.
5.1.1 Syntax
The syntax of propositional logic consists of three components: the symbols that
are used in the language, the syntactic rules for combining these symbols and the
proof rules for reasoning. These three components can be understood in the sense
of a natural language. The symbols are the possible words that can be used. The
syntactic rules describe the grammar of the language. Finally, the proof rules are
the human logic that is used for making decisions without giving explicit meaning
to the facts.
In propositional logic, the fundamental element is a proposition, called a for-
mula. It can be considered as a declarative statement in natural language. In
Example 8 on page 19, Requirement1.7 has been specified as a complex formula in
propositional logic, it is called a complex formula because it is composed of atomic
formulas and logical connectives. The atomic formulas are DWEL(v), Solllage,
Spitz and BHSS and the logical connectives are ¬, ∧, ∨. The atomic formu-
las cannot be further decomposed and do not contain any connective. Complex
formulas are simply called formulas in this report.
The syntactic part of propositional logic defines the possible connectives that
are allowed to be used in propositional logic and also the syntactic rules for form-
ing formulas. These syntactic rules are expressed in Backus Naur Form (BNF)
[Nau60, ML86]1 as follows:
φ ::= q|¬φ|φ ∧ φ|φ ∨ φ|φ→ φ|(φ)
q is an atomic formula and φ is a formula. A propositional formula that is com-
posed based on these six expression rules (Rule1 is q, Rule2 is ¬φ, Rule3 is φ∧ φ,
Rule4 is φ ∨ φ, Rule5 is φ → φ and Rule6 is (φ)) is called well formed formula
(wff). The steps in composing a wff ¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage ∨ ¬Spitz based on
these rules are as follows:
φ ⇒ φ ∨ φ (Apply Rule4)
⇒¬φ ∨ φ (Apply Rule2,replace the first φ by ¬φ)
⇒¬q ∨ φ (Apply Rule1,replace φ by q)
⇒¬DWEL(v) ∨ φ (Replace q by atomic formula DWEL(v))
⇒¬DWEL(v) ∨ φ ∨ φ (Apply Rule4, replace φ
by φ ∨ φ)
⇒¬DWEL(v) ∨ q ∨ φ (Apply Rule1, replace the first φ by q)
⇒¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage ∨ φ (Replace q by atomic formula Solllage)
⇒¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage ∨ ¬φ (Apply Rule2, replace φ by ¬φ)
⇒¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage ∨ ¬q (Apply Rule1, replace φ by q)
⇒¬DWEL(v)∨Solllage∨¬Spitz (Replace q by atomic formula Spitz)
1BNF is a formal notation and it is commonly used to define the syntax of a language in
computer science, for example, the syntax of a programming language. The meaning of the BNF
notations ’::=’, ’|’ and ’⇒’ are listed on page 109. It is not the scope of this thesis to explain
BNF in more detail. Interested readers are referred to the above cited literature.
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Based on these expression rules, ¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage→ is not a wff. Since
the logical connective → occurs in the formula, Rule5 must be applied in the
steps of composing this formula. In Rule5, the left hand side and the right hand
side of → must be replaced by using another expression rule. However, the right
hand side of → in ¬DWEL(v) ∨ Solllage→ cannot be replaced anymore by any
matched expression rule because it is an empty string. Therefore, this formula
is not a wff2. In the OBLH tool, the syntactic rules are defined as a grammar
specification. This specification is then converted to a grammar parser written in
Java using the well-defined Java package called JavaCC [Sun09].
Some constructions of wff are standardized and considered as normal forms.
One of these normal forms is Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF). A DNF is a
disjunction of conjunctive clauses c. Each clause consists of atomic formulas or
negations of atomic formulas which are connected by ∧ and these clauses are
connected by ∨. A wff φ is considered in DNF if it is built based on the rules as
follows:
c :: = q|(¬q)|(c ∧ c)
φ :: = c|(c ∨ φ)
In propositional logic, a set of proof rules is defined for the purpose of reason-
ing. They describe how formulas should be manipulated in order to deduce the
conclusion. The process of applying the rules is called natural deduction and the
conclusions are said to be made syntactically. In OBLH, reasoning is achieved se-
mantically, therefore, natural deductions will not be discussed in detail. Interested
readers are referred to [Lee08, BL99, VOQ88].
5.1.2 Semantics
The semantic part of propositional logic defines the meaning of the connectives
and formulas. Truth values are assigned to a formula in order to give a meaning to
a sentence. The truth values in propositional logic are true (T) and false (F). The
assignment of a truth value to a formula is called an evaluation of a formula. This
means, in propositional logic, each formula can be evaluated to be true or false.
The meaning of a formula or a connective is expressed in a truth table. It shows all
the possible evaluations of a formula or a connective. For example, the meaning of
the propositional connectives ¬, ∧, ∨ and→ are presented as truth tables in Table
5.1. Table 5.1 shows the truth tables of these four logical connectives. In the truth
table of the logical connective implication →, the first two columns express the
possible evaluations of the atomic formulas φ and ψ, the third column expresses
the results of the evaluations. Each line is an evaluation of the formula.
If a statement is expressed in the form of a logical implication (e.g. φ → ψ),
then one can conclude that ”Whenever φ is evaluated to be true, then ψ must also
be true”. In other words, this formula is evaluated to be true or correct, when
such combinations of truth values occur as shown in the truth table. Furthermore,
2Except in this location and in the example in Figure 4.2 on page 36, a wff is simply called a
formula in this thesis.
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φ ¬φ
1 T F
2 F T
φ ψ φ∧ψ
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T F
4 F F F
φ ψ φ∨ψ
1 T T T
2 T F T
3 F T T
4 F F F
φ ψ φ→ψ
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T T
4 F F T
Table 5.1: Truth tables of ¬, ∧, ∨ and →
the formula is also evaluated to be true independent of the truth value of ψ if φ is
evaluated to be false. For instance, in Example 6 on page 17, Requirement2.3.1 can
be expressed by the logical formula EL(v)→ Solllage. Based on the definition of
logical implication, this formula means whenever a point is locked as a route, an
overlap or flank protection element of another route, then it must be in a proper
position for the requested overlap. If this is not the case, then the requirement
is not fulfilled. In other words, Requirement2.3.1 is evaluated to be false. It also
means that if the point is not locked, then the requirement is fulfilled independent
of the position of this point. These evaluations of the formula are expressed in
Table 5.2. It shows that the meaning of this formula is exactly the same as the
meaning of the system requirement 2.3.1.
EL(v) Solllage EL(v)→ Solllage
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T T
4 F F T
Table 5.2: Evaluations of EL(v)→ Solllage
The truth table of another logical formulation of Requirement2.3.1 is also shown
in Table 5.3.
EL(v) Solllage ¬Solllage EL(v) ∧ ¬Solllage ¬(EL(v) ∧ ¬Solllage)
1 T T F F T
2 T F T T F
3 F T F F T
4 F F T F T
Table 5.3: Evaluations of ¬(EL(v) ∧ ¬Solllage)
5.1.3 Reasoning
In OBLH, checking the correctness of static conditions of the interlocking logic is
based on two concepts of propositional reasoning. They are the concept of logical
consequence and logical equivalence. The first concept is expressed mathematically
as follows:
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φ1,φ2, ...,φn |= ψ
(φ1, φ2, ..., φn) is a set of formulas and this set is called the premise. ψ is another
formula and it is called the conclusion. |= is called semantic entailment. This
expression is called a sequent. The sequent can be read as following, if formulas
in the premise are all evaluated to be true, then check whether ψ is also evaluated
to be true. If this is the case, the sequent is said to be valid and ψ is the logical
consequence of the premise (φ1, φ2 ..., φn).
In a semantic reasoning of logical consequence of formulas, truth tables of
(φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ ...∧ φn) and ψ are compared. Whenever the result of the evaluations of
(φ1 ∧φ2 ∧ ...∧φn) is true, then ψ must also evaluated to be true in its truth table.
In other words, one check whether the formula (φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ ... ∧ φn)→ ψ holds.
For example, consider the sequent (EL(v), (EL(v) → Solllage)) |= Solllage.
The truth table of the premise is shown in Table 5.4. To check the validity of
this sequent, one must find the results of the evaluations of the premise (EL(v)→
Solllage) ∧ EL(v) are true and then check the corresponding evaluation of the
conclusion Solllage. If the evaluation of Solllage is true, then the sequent is valid
and Solllage is the logical consequence of (EL(v) → Solllage) ∧ EL(v). In this
example, there is only one evaluation in which the premise is evaluated to be true
(line 1), the evaluation of Solllage is true in this case. Therefore, the sequent is
valid.
The truth table of the premise of another sequent (¬EL(v), (EL(v)→ Solllage))
|= Solllage is shown in Table 5.5. This truth table shows that this sequent is in-
valid because of the evaluation indicated in line 4. There are two evaluations in
which the premise is evaluated to be true. They are line 3 and 4. In line 4, the
evaluation of the conclusion Solllage is false. It does not fulfill the defined rela-
tion between the premise and the conclusion. Therefore, this sequent is invalid
and Solllage is not the logical consequence of (¬EL(v), (EL(v)→ Solllage)).
EL(v) Solllage EL(v)→ Solllage (EL(v)→ Solllage) ∧ EL(v)
1 T T T T
2 T F F F
3 F T T F
4 F F T F
Table 5.4: Checking the logical consequence of two formulas semantically
EL(v) Solllage ¬EL(v) EL(v)→ Solllage (EL(v)→ Solllage)
∧¬EL(v)
1 T T F T F
2 T F F F F
3 F T T T T
4 F F T T T
Table 5.5: The sequent (¬EL(v), (EL(v)→ Solllage)) |= Solllage is not valid
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Natural Propositional Decision
language logic table
System requirements Admissible T Y
Checking conditions Inadmissible F N
Result Wrong Invalid Wrong
specification sequent specification
Table 5.6: Verification of system requirements against checking conditions
Natural Propositional Decision
language logic table
Situation Admissible T Y
System requirements Inadmissible F N
Result Inadmissible Invalid Inadmissible
situation sequent situation
Table 5.7: Situational analysis of a situation against system requirements
The logical consequence of two formulas can also be checked by applying the
proof rules of propositional logic. In this case, the semantic entailment symbol is
replaced by the syntactic entailment `.
It has been mentioned in Section 4.3.4 that it is important to check whether
those situations admissible under system requirements, are also admissible under
the specification of checking conditions for verification, like the expected behavior
of the system or safety requirements. This checking is exactly the same as the
definition of a sequent (see Table 5.6). Therefore, the concept of a sequent is
applied in OBLH to verify the system requirements against the expected behavior
or safety requirements. It is defined in Method 4. In other words, when system
requirements are specified and a checking condition for verification are defined
as propositional formulas SR and CC, respectively, then verification is modeled
as a sequent SR |= CC. Since the formulas are expressed in the form of decision
tables, the sequent in steps 3 of Method 4 is written as DTSR |= DTCC . It is shown
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 that those evaluations of the premise (system requirements)
which cause the invalidity of the sequent can be found and therefore, those wrongly
specified system requirements can be indicated and discovered.
The concept of checking the fulfillment of a situation S to the system require-
ments SR (see Section 4.3.2) can also be defined by the same concept S |= SR.
In this sequent, one assumes that the situation is admissible and then it is im-
portant to check whether this situation is also admissible under the specification
of the system requirements (see Table 5.7). If this sequent is invalid, then this
means the situation is not admissible . This sequent can only be invalid if the
situation is specified as inadmissible in the system requirements. Since the sys-
tem requirements and the situation are expressed in the form of decision tables
and the situation is also specified in a decision table, the sequent is written as
DTS |= DTSR.
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Natural Propositional Decision
language logic table
First requirement Admissible T Y
Second requirement Inadmissible F N
Result Wrong Invalid Wrong
specification sequent specification
(a)
Natural Propositional Decision
language logic table
First requirement Inadmissible F N
Second requirement Admissible T Y
Result Wrong Invalid Wrong
specification sequent specification
(b)
Table 5.8: Analysis of two system requirements (a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
By comparing between two system requirements, the inconsistent evaluation
results of these two system requirements over the same situation must be found.
The differences can be described by two cases (see Table 5.8). The first case is
that the situation is evaluated to be admissible under the first requirement and is
not evaluated to be admissible under the second requirement. In the second case,
the situation is not evaluated to be admissible under the first requirement and is
evaluated to be admissible under the second requirement. Therefore, in order to
find out the inconsistent specifications, both cases need to be checked. As it has
been shown above and in Table 5.8, one can formally define these checkings by
using the concept of logical consequence. Given that the first requirement and the
second requirement are specified as formulas Requirement1 and Requirement2,
respectively, the checking of the first case is written as a sequent Requirement1 |=
Requirement2 (see Step 3 of Method 1). The checking of the second case is
written as another sequent Requirement2 |= Requirement1 (see Step 4 of Method
1). Since both cases must be analyzed, both step 3 and step 4 are defined in
Method 1. The inconsistent specifications are indicated by the evaluations of the
premise that cause the invalidity of the sequent (see Table 5.5).
Mathematically, logical equivalence of Requirement1 and Requirement2 are
said to be checked in this case. If no difference in evaluations of two formulas is
found, then these two formulas are said to be logically equivalent. Furthermore, if
the validity of sequents are checked semantically, then these formulas are said to
be semantically equivalent. In other words, they express the same meaning.
The truth tables in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 are the propositional formalizations
of the system requirement Requirement2.3.1. Imagine that these two formulas
(e.g. Requirement3, Requirement4) are specified in two different chapters in the
interlocking system requirements specification and the corresponding written texts
are not provided. They describe the same concept but are defined with different
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logical connectives. Based on the concepts of OBLH, it is then important to check
whether an inconsistency exists among these two specifications (formulas), this
means logical equivalence of Requirement3 and Requirement4. First of all, the
validity of sequent Requirement3 |= Requirement4 is checked. The results of
evaluations of Requirement3 which are true must also evaluated to be true in the
truth table of Requirement4. Secondly, the validity of sequent Requirement4 |=
Requirement3 is checked. The results of evaluations of Requirement4 which are
true, must also evaluated to be true in the truth table of Requirement3. No
difference in evaluation is found in both checkings. Therefore, Requirement3 and
Requirement4 define the same system requirement.
5.2 Introduction to Decision Tables
Decision tables are utilized in various concepts and functions of OBLH. For exam-
ple, the process of verification and analysis of interlocking system requirements are
carried out by specifying system requirements or safety requirements in decision
tables. The results of checkings are also indicated in decision tables. Since it plays
an important role in this formal framework, decision tables of OBLH and their
properties must be formally defined.
In this section, decision tables are introduced both informally and formally in
Section 5.2.1. The properties of decision tables and those that are important in
OBLH are defined in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Definition of Decision Tables
Decision tables are discussed informally based on the following example. Figure
5.1 is a decision table. This decision table specifies the system requirement 2.4
(ZPZ conditions for an infrastructure object located within the overlap and in
German: ZPZ-Bedingungen je Fahrwegelement im Durchrutschweg) of the speci-
fication [Tut06]. The first column of the decision table is composed of two parts:
the conditions of the system and the actions that are triggered based on the con-
ditions. The first part is called condition stub and the second part is called action
stub. The action stub contains the actions of the system. The condition stub
contains all the possible conditions that will trigger the actions. In Figure 5.1, row
1 - 5 of the first column are the conditions of infrastructure elements and row 6 of
the first column is the action. The action of this table is ZPZDWegElement.
The other columns show the possible combinations of the condition entries and
the corresponding action entry. These columns are called the rules of a decision
table. In this example, the condition and action entries are specified by either Y
or N. They indicate Yes and No, respectively. The condition entry is described
by these values. It is called a limited condition entry. The condition can be
formulated as a yes-no question. For example, in Figure 5.1, the first condition
is Solllage, this can be formulated as ”Is the point in a proper position for the
requested overlap?” If a condition is specified by different attributes, it is called
extended condition entry. For example, a condition like ”The aspects of a main
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signal” can be Hp0, Ks1, Ks2. There is another symbol in the condition entry
’–’. This entry means ”do not care”. This entry is called ’Don’t-care’ entry. The
action of this rule will not be affected by this condition. In other words, no matter
whether this condition is evaluated to Y or N, it will lead to the same result in the
corresponding rule.
In Figure 5.1, the action entry contains Y or N which indicates Yes and No
respectively. Y means the action would be triggered by the combination of condi-
tions. If the corresponding action will not take place, N is specified in the action
entry. The third column (R2) indicates that the point is in an improper position
for the requested overlap and it is a manually locking point, then ZPZDWegElement
is negative. Similar to the condition entry, if the action entry is specified by the
values, Y or N, it is called limited action entry and if it is specified by different
attributes, it is called extended action entry.
Figure 5.1: The evaluation of ZPZDWegElement in a decision table
In OBLH, propositional logic is used to specify the properties of infrastructure
objects. It has been mentioned in Section 5.1.2 that the meaning of a proposition
is given by the assignment of truth values. There are two truth values which
are T and F and they are identical to Y and N respectively. As a result, decision
tables with limited condition and action entries are used to express the static
conditions. A part of definitions of a well-formed OBLH decision table DTOBLH
is given formally as follows:
• Definition 1 Condition set
C = {C1, C2, ..., Cc}
The condition set indicates the set of condition symbols. In the railway
domain, C contains all the possible attributes of infrastructure objects. For
example,
CESTW−R = {Solllage, FWEL(b), DWEL(b), FLEL(b), BHSS, Spitz}.
• Definition 2 Condition domain
CD = {{Y, N}}
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The condition domain CD indicates the possible values of the condition sym-
bols. As mentioned above, propositions that are used to describe the prop-
erties of each infrastructure object has only two truth values. Therefore, the
condition domain CD has only one subset which has only two elements, Y
(Yes) and N (No).
• Definition 3 Condition subject
CS = {CS1, CS2, ..., CSk}
k: number of conditions in a decision table and CS ⊆ C
The condition subject indicates a set of condition symbols of a decision table.
This means, the condition subject must be a subset of the condition set. In
Figure 5.1, the condition subjects are Solllage, Usp, FWEL(b), DWEL(b),
FLEL(b) and Bsp3.
CSZPZDwegElement = {Solllage, Usp, FWEL(b), DWEL(b), FLEL(b), Bsp}.
• Definition 4 Condition
Ci = (CSti, {Y, N} )
A condition is an ordered pair. Each pair indicates the condition subject
and its possible values. If the possible values of a condition subject are Y
and N, then the condition is called limited condition entry. In Figure 5.1, the
condition Solllage is specified as an ordered pair (Solllage, {Y, N}).
• Definition 5 Condition space
SPACE(C) = {Y, N}k
Condition Space indicates the possible combination of the condition entries
in a decision table. Since all condition entries are limited condition entries,
the total number of possible combinations is |SPACE(C)| is 2k without
the introduction of ’Don’t-care’ entries. For example, the total number of
conditions of the decision table in Figure 5.1 is 6 and the total number of
possible combinations is then 64.
• Definition 6 Action set
A = {A1, A2, ..., Aa}
The action set is a set of action symbols. It contains all the possible actions
that could be triggered in the domain. For example, in the railway domain,
A = {ZPZDWegElement, ZPZDWeg}.
• Definition 7 Action domain
AD = {{Y, N}}
Similar to the condition domain, it contains the possible values of each action
symbol. There are only two possible values of the action symbol that are
3In Figure 5.1, the action subjects FWEL(b), DWEL(b) and FLEL(b) are indicated without
the pair of brackets. It is because brackets cannot be used to specify a proposition in OBLH
tool. To remain the consistency of the definition of decision tables, FWELb is considered as the
same as FWEL(b).
76 FORMAL LOGICS IN OBLH
used in DTOBLH . They are Y (Yes) and N (No). They indicate whether a
safe route can be built during each phase of the development process under
the logic of OBLH.
• Definition 8 Action subject
AS = {ASk}
ASk ∈ A
The action subject is a set of action symbols in a decision table. From this
definition, each DTOBLH can only have one action symbol and it has been
defined in the action set. In Figure 5.1, the action subject is ZPZDwegElement.
ASZPZDwegElement = {ZPZDwegElement}.
• Definition 9 Action
Ai = (ASmi, {Y, N})
The action is a set of ordered pair of action symbols and their possible values.
If the possible values of an action subject are the truth values Y and N, then
the action is called limited action entry. In Figure 5.1, the Action is specified
as an ordered pair (ZPZDwegElement, {Y, N}).
• Definition 10 Action space
SPACE(A) = {Y, N}
The action space indicates the possible pairs of actions in the decision table.
Each DTOBLH can be specified by one action. As a result, the number of
elements in this set is two.
• Definition 11 Decision table as matrix
DT = (dtj) =
(
dij
a1j
)
i ∈ {1, ..., k} and j ∈ {1, ..., n}
k: number of conditions in the decision table
n: number of rules in condition tables
dij ⊆ 2{Y,N}\ {∅}
a1j ∈ {Y, N}
DTOBLH is defined as a matrix. Informally speaking, dtj represents a rule in
a decision table. Each of the rules is composed of conditions and one action.
There is one action which is defined in the action subject. As mentioned
above, ’Don’t-care’ entries can be used to combine rules together. ’Don’t-
care’ entries is represented as ’–’ and defined as dij = ’–’ which corresponds
to dij = {Y, N}.
5.2.2 Decision Tables in Object-Based Lastenheft
A part of the definitions of DTOBLH has been given in the last section (from
Definition 1 to Definition 11). Properties of decision tables are discussed in this
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section. DTOBLH must satisfy two of these properties which are consistency and
completeness DTConsistency and DTCompleteness.
The first property of a decision table is called rule overlapping. Rule overlap-
ping means that the intersection of all condition entries of two rules is not empty.
Figure 5.2 shows the three possible rule overlappings of decision tables. In Figure
5.2(a), R1 and R2 are the same and the intersection of the condition entries is
(Y, Y, N). The intersection of the condition entries is (Y, Y, N) in Figure 5.2(b). In
Figure 5.2(c), the intersection is (Y,Y,–). Overlapping DTOverlap is formally defined
as follows:
• Definition 12 DTOverlap
(∃j, k ∈ {1, ..., n})((∀i ∈ {1, ..., c}) j 6=k ∧ (dij∩dik 6=∅))
R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y Y
X3 N N
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
N
R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y Y
X3 -- N
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
N
(a) (b)
R1 R2
X1 -- Y
X2 Y --
X3 -- --
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
--
(c)
Figure 5.2: Overlapping of rules in decision tables
R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y Y
X3 N N
a Y Y
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
N
R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y Y
X3 -- N
a Y N
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
N
(a) (b)
R1 R2
X1 -- Y
X2 Y --
X3 -- --
a Y N
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
--
(c)
Figure 5.3: Consistency of rules in decision tables
If a decision table contains overlapping rules, two aspects need to be con-
sidered and analyzed. They are consistency and exclusiveness. A decision
table is called inconsistent if the action entries of any overlapping rules are
different. In other words, a same situation can lead to different actions based
on the decision table. There exists a contradiction in the decision table. In
Figure 5.3(a), although the intersection of two rules is not empty, these rules
are consistent because the actions of these rules are the same. Figure 5.3(b)
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and (c) have inconsistencies among rules because there are overlapping rules,
but their actions are different. Consistency DTconsistency of decision tables is
defined as follows:
• Definition 13 DTconsistency
(∀j, k ∈ {1, ..., n})(((∀i ∈ {1, ..., c}) (dij∩dik 6=∅)) → a1j = a1k)
R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y Y
X3 N N
a Y Y
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
N
R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y Y
X3 -- N
a Y Y
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
N
(a) (b)
R1 R2
X1 -- Y
X2 Y --
X3 -- --
a Y Y
∩(R1,R2)
Y
Y
--
R1 R2
X1 N Y
X2 Y --
X3 -- --
a Y Y
∩(R1,R2)
∅
Y
--
(c) (d)
Figure 5.4: Exclusiveness of rules in decision tables
If a decision table contains overlapping rules and the rules are consistent,
exclusiveness can be considered. In other words, there is no ambiguity in
choosing rules to be applied with a given condition pair. For example, in
Figure 5.4(a), (b) and (c), it is not clear which rule should be applied with
a given condition tuple (Y, Y, N) because of the overlapping. Figure 5.4(d)
shows one of the possibilities in ensuring the exclusiveness of rules of the de-
cision table in Figure 5.4(c). Exclusiveness DTExclusiveness is formally defined
as follows:
• Definition 14 DTExclusiveness
(∀j, k ∈ {1, ..., n})((∃i ∈ {1, ..., c}) (dij∩dik=∅))
Inclusiveness of a decision table means if two rules lead to the same action
and contain only one difference in the condition entry, then these two rules
can be combined and this condition entry of the rule must be represented
by the union of the condition domain Y, N, in other words, the symbol ’–’.
In Figure 5.5, the intersection of two rules has two elements, as a result,
Inclusiveness DTInclusiveness is defined as follows:
• Definition 15 DTInclusiveness
(∀j, k ∈ {1, ..., n})((∃i ∈ {1, ..., c})(∀t ∈ {1, ..., c}-{i}) (dij∩dik=∅) ∧
(dtj=dtk)∧ a1j = a1k → dij= {Y, N})
Among the idea of rule overlapping and the properties of decision tables,
there is another concept of decision tables that needs to be introduced. Given
a decision table is consistent, it is said to be completed, if the possible com-
binations of condition entries are specified in the decision table. In Figure
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R1 R2
X1 Y Y
X2 Y N
X3 N N
a Y Y
∩(R1,R2)
Y
∅
N
Figure 5.5: Inclusiveness of rules in decision tables
5.6, the decision table is not complete because there is one rule missing. This
rule is (N, N, Y). The completeness of a decision table is formally defined as
follows:
• Definition 16 DTCompleteness
(∀x ∈ SPACE(C))((∃j ∈ {1, ..., n})((∀i ∈ {1, ..., k})(xi ∈ dij)))
R1 R2 R3
X1 Y N N
X2 -- Y N
X3 -- -- N
a Y Y N
Figure 5.6: An incomplete decision table
• Definition 17 A well-formed OBLH decision table DTOBLH
A decision table is said to be well-formed in OBLH if it satisfies the defini-
tions 1 to 11, the properties DTConsistency and DTCompleteness.
Those decision tables that are used to specify interlocking system requirements
must satisfy this definition. The definitions 1 to 11 are automatically fulfilled if
requirements are specified by using the OBLH tool. Furthermore, completeness
and consistency of a decision table can be checked in the tool. The corresponding
mathematical operations are defined in Section 5.6.1 and Section 5.6.2.
5.3 Propositional Logic and Decision Tables
To support analysis of meaning of a propositional formula, one can transform a
formula into two forms: a truth table or a decision table in the OBLH tool. It
has been mentioned in Section 5.1.2 that truth tables and propositional formulas
are semantically equivalent. A complete and consistent decision table is also se-
mantically equivalent to the corresponding propositional formula. Because of this
property, mathematical structures can be mapped to one another. The mapping
can be implemented as programs or techniques, such that it is carried out auto-
matically. The suitable technique that is used to carry out the transformation,
must also support the implementations of other concepts of OBLH and must be
mathematically well-defined. The technique OBDD satisfies these requirements
and is therefore used to implement the concepts of OBLH.
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The relations between decision tables and propositional formulas are first given
in Section 5.3.1. Using the technique OBDD as the basis to implement the concepts
of OBLH is then discussed in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Propositional formulas and Decision Tables
The equivalence relationship between propositional formulas and decision tables
can be understood informally as follows: When a system requirement of the inter-
locking logic is specified in a decision table, like the decision table shown in Figure
5.1 on page 74, one first defines the conditions of objects called objects’ attributes,
that need to be checked in this requirement. The combinations of these conditions
specify all possible situations that are under consideration w.r.t. the development
of safe routes. In decision tables, the combinations are expressed by using values
Y and N. Then, the evaluation result of each combination is specified in the action
entry with values Y and N.
This way of specifying a system requirement in a decision table is the same
as the evaluation of a formula in a truth table. A truth table consists of all
propositions of the formula and their possible evaluations with truth values T and
F. These two components are analog to the conditions of the decision table and the
combinations of condition entries. The assignment of T and F to the result of each
evaluation in propositional logic is then the same as the assignment of Y and N to
each combination of conditions in a decision table. Their structural relationships
are listed in Table 5.9.
Truth table Decision table
Proposition condition
Proposition formula action
Interpretation(proposition) Limited condition entry
Interpretation(formula) Limited action entry
T Y
F N
Table 5.9: Equivalent structural relationships of truth tables and decision tables
Mathematically, the assignment of truth values in propositional logic is ex-
pressed as a function. This function maps each interpretation of the propositions
to the set of truth values as follows:
f : {1, 0}n → {1, 0}
n: number of propositions in the formula
Such a function is called a boolean function. Propositions of the formula are
called variables in the boolean function. Two truth values true T and false F are
identical to 1 and 0 respectively. They are interchangeable in this work. A boolean
function capture the semantic meaning of a propositional formula. Boolean func-
tions are semantically equivalent to decision tables [ZB99]. Since propositional
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formulas are also semantically equivalent to boolean functions4, the same relation
holds between decision tables and propositional formulas.
Propositional formula Boolean function
Proposition (φ, ψ) boolean variable (a, b)
T 1
F 0
¬φ a
φ ∧ ψ a · b
φ ∨ ψ a+ b
φ→ ψ a+ b
Table 5.10: Equivalent structural relationships of propositional formulas and
boolean functions
5.3.2 Propositional Formulas, Decision Tables and Ordered
Binary Decision Diagrams
A decision table for specifying interlocking system requirements is said to be well-
formed when it satisfies Definition 17. It must be complete and consistent. There-
fore, the transformed decision table from a propositional formula must also satisfy
these two properties. In order to facilitate the process of analyzing decision ta-
bles, the transformed decision table must also satisfy the property DTExclusiveness.
Two rules with the same action entry have at least one difference among their
condition entries. Furthermore, one of the advantages of using decision tables as a
specification method is that the requirements can be expressed in a compact form
in a decision table by combining rules. If there are rules with only one difference
in a condition and the combinations of other conditions are the same and they
lead to the same action, then this difference is represented by the ’Don’t-care’ en-
try. These rules are then combined together and form a more compact decision
table. This is called the optimization of decision tables. A compact decision table
summarizes the possible situations that the system needs to react to and the cor-
responding actions. Finding the smallest size of a decision table, or in other words,
the most optimized decision table, is an NP-hard problem [ZB99]. Therefore, the
focus of this work has not been put on finding the most compact decision table
for the corresponding rule. However, the transformation technique in the OBLH
tool must also provide a mechanism to minimize the number of rules or in other
words, remove the redundant rules.
Table 5.9 has shown that a truth table of a propositional formula can be trans-
formed directly into a decision table [Mon74]. Through such a transformation, de-
cision tables contain all the combinations of condition entries and the correspond-
ing actions without introducing ’Don’t-care’ entries. In this case, DTConsistency,
4In a finite set, boolean expressions are isomorphic to propositional logic, informally, this
means propositional algebra and boolean expressions can be described as equivalent [Joh93].
Their structural relationships are listed in Table 5.10.
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DTCompleteness and DTExclusiveness can be guaranteed based on this transformation.
However, minimizing the number of rules is not supported. Furthermore, one
of the requirements of the transformation technique is that it must also support
mathematical operations, such that decision tables can be analyzed. No corre-
sponding mathematical operations can be applied if this way of transformation is
used. Algorithms need to be developed additionally if this transformation tech-
nique is used.
OBDDs are the type of technique [Bry86] (see Section 5.4) that fulfill all the
mentioned requirements of a transformation technique. An OBDD with the best
variable ordering is a compact form to express a boolean function or in other
words a decision table. OBDDs are based on the concept of binary decision trees
and reduction rules are applied to the trees to obtain a compact representation
of boolean functions. Applying these reduction rules to the binary decision trees
results in a decision table with the corresponding ’Don’t-care’ entries and the
number of rules in the decision table is reduced (see Section 5.4.2). There are dif-
ferent advantages of applying this technique for transformation (see Figure 5.10).
First, a decision table that is generated based on the definition of OBDD fulfills
DTConsistency, DTCompleteness and DTExclusiveness. If a formula or a decision table
is contradictory, only the zero terminal will be generated in an OBDD. Secondly,
mathematically well-defined OBLH concepts can be implemented by applying the
defined boolean operations of OBDDs because of the equivalent relationship. The
defined concepts in the form of propositional formulas can be mapped to boolean
functions. The corresponding propositional operations can be achieved by apply-
ing boolean operations. Since the OBLH concepts are defined by propositional
logic, boolean operations provided by the OBDD technique can then be used to
implement these concepts, for example, checking logical consequence of system
requirements. The OBDD package is a well-developed program that generates
OBDDs based on boolean functions and supports manipulation of OBDDs with
boolean operations [BRB90]. This package can then be used as the underlying
implementation of the OBLH tool. The OBDD package that is used in the OBLH
tool is JADE [Dre02].
The mechanism for minimizing the number of rules in decision tables depends
on variable ordering of OBDDs. One of the drawbacks of this technique is finding
the best variable ordering of OBDDs. This ordering affects the application of the
reduction rules to OBDDs. And therefore, it affects the size of an OBDD repre-
senting a boolean function and the corresponding decision table [BW96, ZB99]. In
Figure 5.7(a), the ordering of the variables is (DWEL(b), Solllage, Spitz, BHSS),
while in Figure 5.7(b), it is (Spitz, BHSS, Solllage, DWEL(b)). The first OBDD
is smaller than the latter one. This implies, the number of rules in the decision
table will be affected (see Figures 5.8 and 5.9). As it has been mentioned above,
the focus of this work is not to generate the smallest decision table, therefore an
investigation of the best ordering for a boolean function is not done. However, the
setting of the suitable initial variable ordering for generating an OBDD has been
considered based on the characteristics of the reduction rules. In Section 5.5.1,
the initial variable ordering of an OBDD representing the boolean function (or the
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propositional formula) is discussed. Figure 5.10 describes the activities and the de-
cisions that have to be made during the transformation of a propositional formula
to a decision table with OBDD. This algorithm is called AOBDDTransformation.
Figure 5.7: OBDDs of Requirement1.7
Figure 5.8: A decision table of the OBDD in Figure 5.7(a)
Figure 5.9: A decision table of the OBDD in Figure 5.7(b)
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Figure 5.10: The transformation from propositional formulas to decision tables
with OBDDs
5.4 Introduction to Ordered Binary Decision Di-
agrams
The advantages of using OBDDs as the transformation technique in this work
has been briefly discussed in the above section. In this section, an introduction
to OBDDs is first given. OBDDs are defined based on three different concepts.
These concepts are Binary Decision Diagram (BDD), Reduced Binary Decision
Diagram (RBDD) and variable orderings. The first concept is discussed in Sec-
tion 5.4.1. An introduction to RBDDs is given in 5.4.2. The concept of variable
orderings and OBDDs is elaborated in Section 5.4.3.
5.4.1 Definition of Binary Decision Diagrams
A boolean function can be represented by a truth table. A truth table can be
viewed as a decision table without the properties of DTInclusiveness. This means
the directly transformed decision table from a boolean function contains redundant
rules (see Section 5.3.2). A boolean function can also be represented by a BDD (see
Figure 5.12 on page 87). If this binary decision diagram is directly transformed as
a decision table, then this decision table fulfills Definition 17 and DTExclusiveness.
However, redundant rules will exist. Before giving the formal definition of a BDD,
some concepts and notations must be defined.
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• Definition 18 Directed graphs
G = (V,E)
V is a finite set of vertices and E is a finite set of edges
A directed graph is defined by a finite set of vertices and a finite set of
edges. In Figure 5.11, there are four vertices and five edges. It can be
defined as a directed graph G as follows: G = (V,E), V = {v1, v2, v3, v4} and
E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5}.
Figure 5.11: A directed graph
• Definition 19 Initial node and terminal node of an edge e
initial : E → V
terminal : E → V
An edge can be considered as a connection between two vertices. One of the
vertices is the beginning of a connection, called the initial node of an edge
e. The end of the connection is called the terminal node of the edge e. The
function initial is defined to map the edge to its initial node and terminal
maps the edge to its terminal node. In Figure 5.11, if init(e1) = v1 and
terminal(e1) = v2, then e1 is the edge that connects the vertices v1 and v2.
• Definition 20 A Path in a graph is a sequence of edges e1, e2..., en
(∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1})(terminal(ei) = initial(ei+1))
ei ∈ E
A path is composed of at least one edge and two vertices. The edges of a path
have the relationship that the terminal node of an edge is the initial node of
the following edge. In Figure 5.11, a path from the vertices v2 to v4 is (e3, e5).
The sequence e3, e5 forms a path because initial(e5) = terminal(e3).
• Definition 21 A cycle in a graph is a path e1, e2...en
terminal(en) = initial(e1)
As a cycle, the terminal node of the last edge of a path is the initial node
of the first edge of a path. In Figure 5.11, the edges e3 and e4 form a cycle.
It is because initial(e4) = terminal(e3). This sequence also forms a cycle
because terminal(e4) = initial(e3). A graph without a cycle is called an
acyclic graph.
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• Definition 22 v0 ∈ V is an initial node of a graph
, iff
(∀e ∈ E)(terminal(e) 6= v0)
An initial node v0 of a graph is a vertex that does not have an incoming
edge. In other words, the terminal node of any edge cannot be the initial
node of the graph. In Figure 5.11, v1 is the only initial node.
• Definition 23 v ∈ V is a terminal node of a graph
, iff
(∀e ∈ E)(initial(e) 6= v)
Vt is the set of the terminal nodes of a graph. A terminal node of a graph is a
vertex that does not have an outgoing edge. In other words, the initial node
of any edge of the graph cannot be the terminal node. The set of terminal
nodes of Figure 5.11 is {v4}.
• Definition 24 v ∈ V is a non-terminal node of a graph
, iff
(∃e ∈ E)(initial(e) = v)
A non-terminal node of a graph is a vertex that must have an outgoing edge.
In other words, if a vertex v is a non-terminal node, there must exist an
edge whose initial node is v. The set of non-terminal nodes of Figure 5.11 is
{v1, v2, v3}.
Definition 25 BDDs
A BDD has the following properties:
• a directed acyclic graph
• an unique initial node vinitial
• non-terminal nodes are labeled with a function variable : (V −Vt)→ L where
L is a set of variables of a boolean function. Each non-terminal node has
exactly two children that are assigned by two functions low : (V − Vt) → V
and high : (V − Vt)→ V and the properties:
(∀v ∈ (V −Vt))(∃e1, e2 ∈ E)((initial(e1) = initial(e2) = v)∧(terminal(e1) =
low(v)) ∧ (terminal(e2) = high(v)) ∧ (edge(e1) = 0) ∧ (edge(e2) = 1))
(∀v ∈ (V − Vt))(|{e ∈ E|initial(e) = v}| = 2)
where edge : E → {0, 1}
• terminal nodes are labeled with a function value : Vt → {0, 1}
The usage of graphical symbols of BDDs is based on the paper [Bry86]. Fig-
ure 5.12 shows a BDD representation of the formula a ∧ b. Terminal nodes and
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non-terminal nodes are represented by squares and circles, respectively. The ini-
tial node of the diagram is always drawn at the top. Edges labeled with 0 are
represented by dashed lines, while edges labeled with 1 are drawn as solid lines.
Furthermore, the direction of the edges will not be indicated in the graph. Nor-
mally, the orientation of an edge is defined from top to bottom.
Figure 5.12: A BDD of a ∧ b, truth table and boolean function
The BDD in Figure 5.12 is formally defined as follows:
V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7}
E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6}
L = {a, b}
Vt = {v4, v5, v6, v7}
vinitial = v1
variable = {(v1, a), (v2, b)}
low = {(v1, v3), (v2, v5), (v3, v7)}
high = {(v1, v2), (v2, v4), (v3, v6)}
value = {(v4, 1), (v5, 0), (v6, 0), (v7, 0)}
edge = {(e1, 1), (e2, 1), (e3, 0), (e4, 0), (e5, 1), (e6, 0)}
The vertices are defined without labeling in a directed graph. In BDDs, the
non-terminal and terminal nodes are labeled with variables of the boolean function
and values 0 or 1 respectively. Terminal nodes are the function values of a boolean
function. Each of the non-terminal nodes has exactly two children. They are the
low child and high child. They can be reached by traversing via the dashed line
and solid line respectively. A BDD can be used to represent a boolean function. In
Figure 5.12, the path from v1 to v4 represents (1,1,1) or the interpretation (T,T,T)
in the truth table of this formula. One can read this path as if the variable a is
assigned by the truth value T (1) and the variable b is assigned by the truth value
T (1), then the truth value of this formula is T (1).
5.4.2 Definition of Reduced Binary Decision Diagrams
The BDD in Figure 5.12 has a redundancy. It can also be viewed as a redundance
in a decision process. For example, when the value zero is assigned to the variable
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a, the function value is 0. The function value is independent of the assignment
of the variable b. The size of this BDD can be reduced if this redundance is
removed. A BDD is a RBDD if the redundances in the BDD are eliminated
based on three requirements of a RBDD [Bry86], [HR04] and [And98]. These
three requirements are also considered as the reduction rules that apply to BDDs.
These three requirements remove the unnecessary decision points in a BDD and
reduce the size of a BDD. It is the same as consolidating rules in a decision table.
These three requirements are defined in the following definition.
Definition 26 RBDDs
A RBDD is a BDD with the following properties:
1. There exists only two terminal nodes labeled with 0 and 1.
|Vt| = 2 and value is a bijective function.
2. No non-terminal node has the same children
(∀v ∈ (V − Vt))(¬(low(v) = high(v)))
3. No non-terminal nodes with the same variable labeling have the same children
(∀v1, v2 ∈ (V −Vt))((variable(v1) = variable(v2)∧¬(v1 = v2)→ ¬(low(v1) =
low(v2) ∧ high(v1) = high(v2))))
In a BDD, the non-terminal nodes can only be labelled 0 or 1, the size of a
BDD can be reduced by sharing the non-terminal nodes. This idea leads to the first
requirement of a RBDD. The second requirement does not allow the two outgoing
edges of a node vi point to the same node vj. This means, the evaluation of the
boolean function does not depend on the assignment of vi. In this case, the vertex
vi will be removed and the incoming edges of vi will be redirected to vj. In Figure
5.13(a), one of the vertices with a label b points to the same terminal node 0. This
vertex is then removed and its incoming edge is redirected to the terminal node 0 in
Figure 5.13(b). The third requirement states that if there exists two nodes vi and
vj with the same variable labeling sharing the same children or subgraph, then one
of the nodes, say vj and its outgoing edges must be removed. The incoming edges
of vj are then redirected to vi. In Figure 5.14(a), the vertices v2 and v3 do not
fulfil the last requirement of RBDD because variable(v2) = variable(v3), low(v2) =
low(v3) and high(v2) = high(v3). As a result, one of the nodes must be removed.
In 5.14(b), v3 is removed. However, this graph is not an RBDD because low(v1) =
high(v1). Based on the second requirement, v1 is redundant and therefore it must
be eliminated. Figure 5.14(c) is the valid RBDD.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.13: Reductions on a BDD of a ∧ b
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.14: Reductions on a BDD
5.4.3 Definition of Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
Figure 5.15 shows a valid RBDD, it satisfies the three requirements of RBDD.
However, the path v1, v2, v3 and v4 is redundant because the sub-path from v3 to
v4 will never be taken because variable(v1) = variable(v3) and edge(e1) = 1. This
means the variable a has been assigned with the value 1 and cannot be assigned
with a new value. The latter assignment will not be considered. Based on this
concept, variable ordering is introduced to RBDD. A RBDD with variable order-
ing is called Ordered Reduced Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD). It is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 27 OBDDs
An OBDD is a RBDD with the following properties:
(∀e ∈ E)(terminal(e) /∈ Vt → (order(variable(initial(e)))
< order(variable(terminal(e))))) order : L → {0, 1, ...n} and order is a bijective
function
In this work, if order(variable(vi)) < order(variable(vj)), then variable(vi) is
said to be ordered higher than variable(vj). A path from the initial node to the last
non-terminal node of an OBDD represents a subset of the domain of the boolean
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Figure 5.15: A BDD of a ∧ b where a variable a occurs more than once
function. The terminal node of this path represents the corresponding projection
in the co-domain. An OBDD obdd is used to evaluate the corresponding boolean
function f and transform : L→ {1, 0} in the following way:
Algorithm 1 AOBDDEvaluation
1. Start at vinitial of obdd
2. while (current vertex v /∈ Vt)
{ if (transform(variable(v)) == 0) v = low(v); else v = high(v); }
3. if (value(v) == 0) f(x1, x2, ..., xn) = 0; else f(x1, x2, ..., xn) = 1;
OBDD is the canonical representation of a boolean function [Bry86]. This
property brings advantages in manipulating OBDDs and analyzing of boolean
functions. First, redundant variables of a boolean function can be found by es-
tablishing the corresponding OBDD. Checking the equivalence of two boolean
functions can be achieved by comparing the structure of the corresponding OB-
DDs. These OBDDs must have a compatible variable ordering. Furthermore, the
validity of a propositional formula can be tested by establishing the correspond-
ing OBDD. If this OBDD has only the node v, v ∈ Vt and value(v) = 0, then
the propositional formula is not valid. Finally, there is a set of defined boolean
operations that can be applied to manipulate OBDDs. These boolean operations
include f , f + g and f · g.
The size of an OBDD in representing a boolean function depends on its vari-
able ordering. In other words, OBDDs that are built based on the same boolean
function with different variable orderings have different sizes. When an OBDD is
used to represent a decision table, the number of rules is also affected by the size
of the OBDD (see Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9). As a result, finding the
variable orderings for the boolean function is an important issue in using OBDDs.
Static and dynamic approaches have been developed in finding the optimal order-
ing [BM02]. Strategies are designed to generate the ordering of an OBDD based
on information of the specific application area in the static approach [FFK88].
Instead of using specific information, the variable ordering of a built OBDD is
changed progressively in dynamic approaches. One of these strategies is the sift-
ing algorithm. The main concept of this approach is swapping adjacent variables
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locally to search for the best ordering. A variable is chosen to exchange the po-
sition with its adjacent variable upwardly and downwardly w.r.t. the OBDD, the
minimum size of the OBDD and the corresponding position is then recorded. If
the size of the current order is bigger than the expected, the process of swapping
terminates. The algorithm continues to swap the next variable until all the vari-
ables have been used for estimation [Rud93] and [The97]. It is an NP-complete
problem to find the best ordering to obtain the most compact OBDD [BW96].
Finding the smallest size of decision tables is an NP-hard problem [ZB99]. As
mentioned above, the focus of this work is not to optimize the number of rules of
a decision table. However, based on the provided reduction rules (see Definition
26), the setting of the initial variable ordering to generate an OBDD that repre-
sents the corresponding boolean function (or the propositional formula) has been
considered. This is discussed in the next section.
5.5 Transformation of Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams and Decision Tables
In Figure 5.10, the process of transforming a propositional formula to a decision
table is generally described. In this section, the idea is further elaborated. The
algorithm is first discussed in Section 5.5.1. The idea of mapping an OBDD to a
decision table is considered in Section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Propositional Formulas and Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams
Algorithm 2 AOBDDTransformation
1. ordering = initial(formula);
2. obdd = build(obdd, ordering);
3. DT = transformToDT (obdd);
The first step of AOBDDTransformation is to transform the propositional for-
mula to a boolean function and initialize the variable ordering of the OBDD. The
propositional formula needs to be first transformed to a boolean function. It is
because the OBDD package generates OBDDs based on boolean functions. A
DNF (see Section 5.1.1 on page 67) of a propositional formula is equivalent to a
boolean function in term of a sum of products (see Table 5.10). Therefore, the
propositional formula is first transformed into DNF. As it has been mentioned
before, the variable ordering of an OBDD affects the application of the reduc-
tion rules, or in other words, the number of rules in the decision table will be
affected. In OBLH, the initialization of the variable ordering is based on the order
of the propositions in the formula. The formulas that need to be transformed are
static conditions of the interlocking system requirements and is defined by objects’
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attributes. Each attribute has a meaning and therefore users can rank the impor-
tance of these attributes based on the meaning of the system requirements (KO
criteria). The more important an attribute is, the higher its position in the written
propositional formula. In order words, in the variable ordering of the OBDD, this
variable is ordered higher than other variables, for example, Requirement1.7 ≡
¬DWEL(b) ∨ Solllage ∨ (¬Spitz ∧ ¬BHSS). Based on the domain knowledge
and the semantic meaning of logical connectives of the formula, the importance of
these attributes is ranked as (DWEL(b), Solllage, Spitz, BHSS). The input formula
to the OBLH tool is then (∼DWELb|Solllage|(∼Spitz& ∼BHSS)). It has been
shown in Figure 5.8 that if this rank is used as the variable ordering of the OBDD,
then the corresponding decision table has only 5 rules. However, if one uses another
ranking like the one in 5.7(b) ((∼Spitz& ∼BHSS)|Solllage| ∼DWELb), then the
number of rules is increased. Therefore, the initial variable ordering of the OBDD
is obtained based on the choice of users. The transformation of the propositional
formula to a DNF and initialization of the variable ordering are implemented in
the method initial(formula).
In step 2 of AOBDDTransformation, the initial variable ordering is used to built
the OBDD via the OBDD package in the method build(obdd, ordering) [Dre02].
After the OBDD is built by the OBDD package, it is mapped to a decision table
based on an algorithm AOBDDDT described in the following section.
5.5.2 Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams and Decision Ta-
bles
The algorithm for evaluating a boolean function with the corresponding OBDD has
been discussed in Section 5.4.3 (see Algorithm 1). A path of an OBDD represents
the relation between the assignment of the boolean variables and the function
values. In other words, each path of an OBDD is a representation of a rule of
the decision table (see Table 5.11). Given a path e1, e2, ..., em of an OBDD, it is
mapped to a rule dtj of the decision table DT as follows:
Algorithm 3 AOBDDDT
1. i = 1 ; while ( i ≤ m )
{ l = order(variable(initial(ei)));
if(edge(ei) == 0) dlj = N; else dlj = Y;
if (i == m){ if (value(terminal(ei)) = 0) a1j = N; else a1j = Y; }i++; }
2. while (i ≤ k) {if ( dij is empty ) dij = -; i++; }
AOBDDDT is implemented as the method transformToDT (obdd) in
AOBDDTransformation. One of the assumptions of this algorithm is that the vari-
able ordering of the function is the same as it is shown in the decision table. The
set of condition subjects is ordered and the ordering is the same as the variable
ordering of the OBDD. (∀l ∈ L)(∀c ∈ CS)((l = c) → (order(l) = position(c))),
where position : CS → {1, ..., n}. In Figure 5.16, one of the paths is e1, e2. Based
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on the above algorithm, the result of step one is dt2 = (Y, Y,,, Y) and the output
of the algorithm is dt2 = (Y, Y,-,-, Y) as it is shown as rule R1 in the decision table
of Figure 5.8 on page 83.
OBDD Decision table
Path rule
L CS
edge(e) = 0 ∧ initial(e) = CSi dtij = N
edge(e) = 1 ∧ initial(e) = CSi dtij = Y
value(v) = 0 ∧ v ∈ (V − Vt) aij = N
value(v) = 1 ∧ v ∈ (V − Vt) aij = Y
φ→ ψ a+ b
Table 5.11: The transformation of OBDDs and decision tables
Figure 5.16: An OBDD of Requirement1.7
As it has been mentioned above, the decision table that is obtained from an
OBDD satisfies the requirements of DTOBLH and DTExclusiveness. If the trans-
formed decision table does not contain any overlapping rules, then these require-
ments are satisfied. As it has been defined in Section 5.2, in a decision table,
if the intersection of a condition entry of any two rules is not empty, then this
decision table does not contain any overlapping rules. Based on the mapping of
OBDDs, no overlapping rules will be produced because of the property of OBDDs.
First, duplicated variables along any path of OBDDs are not allowed. A path of
an OBDD is mapped to a rule of the decision table, the last node of the path is
a non-terminal vertex. A non-terminal vertex of an OBDD (corresponding to a
condition) must have two out-going edges e1 and e2 (corresponding to the condi-
tion entries) and edge(e1) 6= edge(e2). In other words, there exists at least one
condition entry for any two rules that have no intersection.
A propositional formula is used to describe a true sentence or admitted situa-
tion(s). The situation(s) is(are) expressed by atomic formulas and the connectives
in propositional logic. Similarly, in a DTOBLH , each rule is used to describe a situ-
ation with the condition entries and the corresponding action entry. To transform
a decision table to a propositional formula, rules with action entry Y are combined
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by the connective ∨. The condition entries of each rule are connected by the con-
nective ∧. This propositional formula describes the logic of the decision table.
As a result, based on the definition of decision tables in Section 5.2.1, the logic
that is represented by a completed decision table DTOBLH can be expressed by a
propositional formula in DNF. Given a decision table DT , a DNF f is constructed
as follows:
Algorithm 4 AOBDDDTDNF
1. find the rules with a1j = Y.
2. for each rule in this set of rules {
if (d1j == N) cm = ¬C1; else if (d1j = Y) cm = C1;
else {cm = ¬C1; c′m = C1; add(0, cm, Pj); add(|Pj|, c′m, Pj); }
i = 1;
while ( i! = k ){
if ( dij == N ) {s = |Pj|; for( x = 0;x < s;x++ ){cx = cx ∧ ¬Ci;
add(x, cx, Pj); }}
else if ( dij == Y ) {s = |Pj|; for( x = 0;x < s;x++ ){cx = cx ∧ Ci;
add(x, cx, Pj); }}
else {s = |Pj|; for( x = 0;x < s;x++ ){ct = cx; cx = ct ∧ Ci;
c′x = ct ∧ ¬Ci; add(x, cx, Pj); add(|Pj|, c′x, Pj); }}}
}
3. f =
∨n
j=1
∨|Pj |
k=1 ck
where Pj = {Y, N}∗,
cg ∈ Pj, g ∈ {0, 1} and
add : N× {Y, N} × {Y, N}∗ → {Y, N}∗
For example, the propositional formula that expresses the logic of the decision
table in Figure 5.1 on page 74 is (Solllage) ∨ (¬Solllage ∧ ¬Usp ∧ ¬FWELb ∧
¬DWEL(b) ∧ ¬FLEL(b) ∧ ¬ELDurchfahrt). DNF can be used to build the
corresponding OBDD.
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5.6 Object-Based Lastenheft Concepts and Or-
dered Binary Decision Diagrams
The OBDD technique provides boolean operations for manipulating OBDDs. Since
boolean functions, propositional formulas and decision tables are semantically
equivalent, their operations are then interchangeable. The concepts of situational
analysis, verification and analysis of interlocking system requirements are defined
formally in propositional logic in Section 5.1.3. Propositional operations are de-
fined to manipulate the specified situations, checking conditions for verification
and system requirements, such that the goal of each concept can be achieved,
for example, the fulfillment of a situation w.r.t. the system requirements can be
checked. These propositional operations can be completed by the corresponding
mapped boolean operations.
In the OBLH tool, the situations, checking conditions (e.g. safety requirements)
and system requirements are specified in decision tables. These decision tables
are transformed into OBDDs (see Algorithm 4) and defined propositional opera-
tions of each OBLH concepts are achieved by applying the corresponding boolean
functions to these transformed OBDDs. As it has been mentioned before, the
operations on OBDDs are accomplished by the well-developed OBDD package,
therefore, no extra effort needs to be put in developing a program that executes
boolean operations. The correctness of the results is then guaranteed because of
the formal definition of OBDDs. For each OBLH concept, algorithms are designed
to describe the process of generating the OBDDs from decision tables, applying
boolean operations and interpreting the results of the operations.
These algorithms are discussed in this section. Checking the consistency and
completeness of a decision table is discussed in Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, respec-
tively. Implementation of situational analysis and analysis and verification of sys-
tem requirements with OBDDs is then elaborated in the final section.
5.6.1 Checking Consistency of Decision Tables
Given a decision table DT , the consistency of rules in DT is checked based on the
following steps:
Algorithm 5 AOBDDConsistency
1. Build obddY based on the rules with a1j = Y
2. Build obddN based on the rules with a1j = N
3. Apply obddY · obddN and the result is obddConsistency.
A path with 1 as the terminal node in obddConsistency indicates the inconsistency
of the decision table.
In Section 5.2.1, the definition of consistency DTConsistency has been given. A
decision table contains inconsistency, if there exists a pair of overlapping rules and
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their action entries are different. Each path of an OBDD represents a rule. obddY
is built based on the rules of the decision table. The action entries of these rules
are Y. As a result, the paths of obddY with 1 as the terminal node represent the
rules with the action entries Y in the decision table. This set of paths must have
0 as the terminal node in obddN . If one of these paths has 1 as the terminal node
in obddN , then the decision table contains a contradiction. It is because those
paths of obddN with 1 as the terminal node represent rules of the decision table
with the action entry N. This concept is expressed by the propositional formula
obddY ∧obddN and the corresponding equivalent boolean function is obddY ·obddN .
In Section 4.3.3, the pair of inconsistent rules in the decision table (see Figure
4.11 on page 47) is found by using the OBLH tool (see Figure 4.15 on page 49).
The steps of applying AOBDDConsistency to check the consistency of this decision
table is illustrated in Figure 5.17. The OBDD in Figure 5.17(a) is built based
on R1 and R4 because their action entry is Y. The results of step 2 are shown in
Figure 5.17(b). This Figure is built based on R2, R3, R5 and R6. Figure 5.17(c)
shows the result of the algorithm. There is a single path with 1 as the terminal
node and the corresponding transformed decision rule is (Y, N, N, N, N). This is the
same inconsistent rule shown in Figure 4.15 on page 49.
Figure 5.17: Inconsistency and OBDDs
5.6.2 Checking Completeness of Decision Tables
Given a consistent decision table DT , the completeness of DT is checked based on
the following steps:
Algorithm 6 AOBDDCompleteness
1. Build obddY based on the rules with a1j = Y
2. Build obddN based on the rules with a1j = N
3. Apply obddY + obddN and the result is obddCompleteness.
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This algorithm is called AOBDDCompleteness. A path with 0 as the termi-
nal node in obddCompleteness indicates a missing rule of the decision table. If
obddCompleteness has only 1 as the terminal node, the decision table is complete.
There are two possible representations of the paths in obddY that lead to the
terminal node 0. The first possible representation are rules with action entries
N. The second representation are missing rules. The rules in the first case are
supposed to be found in obddN . If these rules cannot be found in obddN as a path
with 1 as the terminal node, then they are the missing rules and the decision table is
incomplete. This concept is expressed by the propositional formula obddY ∨ obddN
and the corresponding equivalent boolean function is obddY + obddN .
The missing rules of the decision table in Figure 4.10 on page 46 are found
by using the OBLH tool. These missing rules are found in the OBLH tool by
the implemented algorithm AOBDDCompleteness. Figure 5.18 illustrates the steps
of AOBDDCompleteness to find the missing rule of the decision table in Figure
4.10. The OBDD in Figure 5.18(a) is obddY . obddN is shown in Figure 5.18(b).
The result of the algorithm obddCompleteness is illustrated in Figure 5.18(c). The
path with 0 as the terminal node represents the missing rules. This path can be
transformed into decision rules based on the algorithm described in Section 5.5.2.
The missing rules are represented as a compact rule (Y, N, -, -, -) which is the same
result as it has been shown in the OBLH tool (see Figure 4.13 on page 48).
Figure 5.18: Checking completeness and OBDDs
5.6.3 Analysis and Verification of Decision Tables
Given decision tables DTS and DTC , the validity of the sequent DTS |= DTC is
checked based on the following steps:
Algorithm 7 AOBDDSequent
1. From DTS, build obddS based on the rules with a1j = Y
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2. From DTC, build obddC based on the rules with a1m = Y
3. Apply obddS + obddC and the result is obddSequent.
j ∈ {1, ..., n} and n: number of rules in the decision table DTS
m ∈ {1, ..., q} and q: number of rules in the decision table DTC
Those paths with 0 as the terminal node in the resulting OBDD illustrate those
evaluations of DTS which cause the invalidity of the sequent.
As it has been shown in Section 5.1.3, situational analysis and checking the cor-
rectness of system requirements are defined as checking the validity of the sequent
between the defined situations, checking conditions for verification and system
requirements. These defined situations, checking conditions and system require-
ments are specified in decision tables and therefore, the algorithm AOBDDSequent
for checking validity of sequents in a form of decision tables is defined as above.
In propositional logic, checking the validity of a sequent (e.g. S |= C) means
to check whether the implication between the premise and the conclusion holds
(S → C ≡ ¬S∨C) (see Section 5.1.3). This can be achieved by the corresponding
boolean function (obddS+obddC ) as it has been shown in step 3 of AOBDDSequent
when decision tables are used to represent the system requirements, a situation
and checking conditions for verification.
The validity of the sequent is indicated by the paths (with 0 as the terminal
node) of the resulting OBDD. As it has been mentioned before, it is very impor-
tant to know the evaluations that cause the invalidity of the sequent. In case
of verification of system requirements, these paths indicate the situations which
are admissible under the system requirements, while are not admissible under the
checking conditions (e.g. expected behavior of the system). For the analysis of
system requirements, these paths indicate the inconsistent specifications between
two system requirements. In the situational analysis, an existence of these paths
means that the situation does not fulfill the system requirements.
In Section 4.3.2, the fulfillment of a situation w.r.t. Requirement1.7 has been
shown (see Figures 4.6 on page 44 and 4.7 on page 44). AOBDDSequent is used by
the OBLH tool to check this fulfillment. Figure 5.19 illustrates the corresponding
steps of applying the algorithm. The OBDD obddS on the left hand side of Figure
5.19(a) describes the specified situation. The OBDD on the right hand side is
the negation of obddS. Based on the decision table of Requirement1.7, obddC is
built and it is shown in Figure 5.19(b). In the final step, the boolean operation
+ is applied to obddC and the negation of obddS. The result is shown in Figure
5.19(c). Since this resulting OBDD contains a path with 0 as the terminal node,
the situation is invalid as it has been shown in the OBLH tool.
The fulfillment of another situation shown in Figure 3.2 has also been checked
by using the OBLH tool (see Figures 4.8 on page 45 and 4.9 on page 45). The steps
of the algorithm to check the fulfillment of this situation are shown in Figure 5.20.
The OBDD obddS2 in the left hand side of Figure 5.20(a) describes the specified
situation. The OBDD in the right hand side is the negation of obddS2. Based
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Figure 5.19: The situational analysis of a situation in Figure 3.1 and OBDDs
on the decision table of Requirement1.7, obddC is built and it is shown in Figure
5.19(b). In the final step, the boolean operation + is applied to obddC and the
negation of obddS2. The result is shown in Figure 5.20(b). Since this resulting
OBDD contains no path with 0 as the terminal node, the situation is valid as it
has been shown in the OBLH tool.
Figure 5.20: The situational analysis of a situation in Figure 3.2 and OBDDs
Chapter 6
Discussion
The motivation of this work has been transformed into a number of ideas to assist
system development teams of different professions to specify, analyze and verify
interlocking system requirements. These ideas and the corresponding implemen-
tations have been discussed informally and formally in previous chapters. This
framework has been successfully applied in an industrial project to model a part
of an interlocking system requirement specification and checked the correctness of
this specification with the OBLH methods [HGS09]. A number of unclear sys-
tem requirements was discovered and discussed in this project. Since no versatile
framework can be developed without potential extensions and improvements, fur-
ther development and investigation of OBLH are outlined based on this industrial
experience. They are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Apart from the investigations on specification of dynamic conditions of the in-
terlocking logic (see Section 4.2.2.2), an additional research idea is to provide users
a chance to declare the dependencies of objects’ attributes (physically unrealistic
situations of railway operations) in decision tables, which can be called domain
knowledge decision tables. Then, the OBLH tool can be used to discover the exis-
tence of these dependencies in system requirements (in the form of decision tables)
and to check whether these dependencies have been stated correctly in the system
requirements according to the domain knowledge.
Static conditions are defined by attributes of infrastructure elements in the
form of propositional formulas or decision tables. Based on the properties of
propositional formulas and decision tables, the combinations of these attributes
define all the situations that the RIS needs to consider during the development of
safe routes. If there exist dependencies among the attributes, some of these situa-
tions might be physically unrealistic situations (e.g. an element must not indicate
the aspect Ks1 and Ks2 at the same time). These unrealistic situations must be
declared as inadmissible in the interlocking logic. If the RIS receives such combi-
nations during the development of a safe route, operational mistakes must appear
among the infrastructure elements and the RIS must evaluate the development
of this safe route as inadmissible. To maintain the correctness and completeness
of the system requirements in the form of decision tables or propositional logic,
these dependencies can be first declared by users as domain knowledge in deci-
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sion tables (e.g. DTDomainknowledge). These domain knowledge decision tables can
be used to assist users in identifying complex dependencies in the static condi-
tions (e.g. in form of decision table DTSR) and check whether these dependencies
are defined according to the declared domain knowledge by applying Method 4
(DTSR |= DTDomainknowledge).
In Figure 6.1, part of the domain knowledge of the signal aspects has been
declared in DT2. According to the text of system requirement 5.2.2 of the spec-
ification [Tut06] (see Example 7 on page 18), the element satisfies the system
requirement 5.2.2 if it shows the aspect Ks1. When this system requirement 5.2.2
is translated to a propositional formula and transformed into a decision table DT1,
this situation is indicated in R1. Based on the checking result DT3 in Figure 6.1,
this rule contains an operational situation which does not have the same result as
it is declared in the domain knowledge decision table DT2. If a computer scientist
reads the system requirement 5.2.2 and transforms it into a program of an RIS
as it has been stated in this example, then an error will exist in the program.
This mistake, of course, can be found out by the domain experts immediately
when the decision table is read. It will then be specified correctly. However, when
complex system requirements are defined in decision tables, decision tables can
be complicated and contain many rules. With this concept, the OBLH tool can
help to identify the dependencies of attributes w.r.t. the declared domain knowl-
edge decision tables in complex decision tables and check whether they are defined
according to the declared domain knowledge.
Figure 6.1: The comparison between the domain knowledge decision table and the
system requirement 5.2.2, Requirement5.2.2 |= SignalDefinition
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In the mentioned industrial project, it has been noticed that a system require-
ment specification (system requirement 3.3 of [Tut06] and see Table 6.1) in the
specification consists of quantified statements. These statements can be modeled
by quantifiers and predicates. Quantifiers are notations that are used in predi-
cate logic [HR04, VOQ88]. There are two predicate quantifiers which are ∀ and
∃. They mean ’for all’ and ’there exists at least one’. If a quantifier is used in
combination with a predicate (an attribute which can be true or false), then it
can be viewed in a similar way as an atomic formula in propositional logic. An
example of an attribute or predicate is FLSchutzbieten(w) which means the point
located in the connected track section can provide flank protection (German: Die
Weiche in dem anschließenden GFM (Gleisfreimeldeeinrichtung)-Abschnitt ko¨nnte
Flankenschuzt bieten.). An example of combinations of a quantifier and an at-
tribute is ∀w ∈ Weichen FLSchutzbieten(w). This combination can be modeled
as an atomic formula in propositional logic as AlleFLSchutzbieten which means all
the points located in the connected track detection section can provide flank pro-
tection. (German: Alle Weichen in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt ko¨nnen
Flankenschutz bieten)
No. System requirement Static condition
3.3 Umstellbedingung fu¨r nicht grenzzeichenfrei
isolierte Weiche oder Kreuzung
(a) Die am ”umzustellenden Schenkel” der
Weiche oder Kreuzung anschließende Weiche
oder Kreuzung muss frei sein, wenn sie nicht
die Flankenschutzlage einnimmt.
Dies gilt fu¨r alle Weichen oder Kreuzungen,
die mit der nicht grenzzeichenfrei
isolierten Weiche oder Kreuzung eine
gemeinsame Gleisfreimeldeeinrichtung
haben.
b) Schließen an den Schenkel der FreiGFM∨
umzustellenden, nichtgrenzzeichenfrei
isolierten Weiche mehrere Weichen
mit einer gemeinsamen Gleisfrei-
meldeeinrichtung an, die alle (∀w ∈ Weiche
Flankenschutz bieten ko¨nnen, muss das FLSchutzbieten(w)∧
Freisein nicht gepru¨ft werden, wenn mindestens ∃w ∈ Weiche
eine Weiche die Flankschutzlage einnimmt. FLSchutzeinnehmen(w))
Table 6.1: The specification of system requirement 3.3
FreiGFM : The track section which is connected to a track
section exposing the fouling point is free.
Der am nicht grenzzeichenfrei isolierten Schenkel
anschließende GFM-Abschnitt ist frei.
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FLSchutzbieten(w): The point located in the connected track section
can provide flank protection.
Die Weiche in dem anschließenden GFM-
Abschnitt kann Flankenschutz bieten.
FLSchutzeinnehmen(w): The point located in the connected track section
is in the flank protective position
Die Weiche in dem anschließenden GFM-
Abschnitt nimmt die Flankenschutzlage ein.
Based on the definition of requirement 3.3 alone (see Figure 6.2), a point with
foul track circuit (German: nicht-grenzzeichenfrei isolierte Weiche) is allowed to
be set to the requested position in the following two cases:
1. The track section which is connected to a track section exposing the fouling
point is free.
2. All the points in this track section can provide flank protection and at least
one of these points is in the flank protective position.
The requirement 3.3(a) is already specified in this predicate formula because
this requirement is fulfilled if the track section which is connected to the point with
foul circuit is free (point 1) or the point in this track section is in the flank protec-
tive position (point 2). The quantifiers in this formula refer directly to attributes,
so that the corresponding static conditions can then be modeled by the specifica-
tion language of OBLH, propositional logic. This is achieved by defining atomic
propositions which express the meaning of ((∀w ∈ WeicheFLSchutzbieten(w))
and (∃w ∈ WeicheFLSchutzeinnehmen(w))), respectively. These atomic propo-
sitions are Alle FLSchutzbieten and Eins FLSchutzeinnehmen, respectively.
The predicate formula is transformed to a decision table in Figure 6.2. The sys-
tem requirement 3.3 is specified as a propositional formula and the formula is
transformed to a decision table in the OBLH tool and is shown in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.2: The meaning of the predicate formula of Requirement3.3
As it has been shown in Figure 6.2, in the current version of the OBLH tool, a
predicate formula with quantifiers can be transformed to a decision table. However,
in this formula, the quantifier can only be used in combination with an attribute.
A condition in a decision table is an atomic formula and the quantified attribute
can be considered as an atomic formula. Therefore, predicate formulas in this form
can be transformed to a decision table. If the quantifiers are used in combination
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Figure 6.3: The meaning of the propositional formula of Requirement3.3
with a complex formula, then the predicate formula cannot be transformed to a
decision table in the current version of the OBLH tool.
There is another aspect that needs to be considered if a system requirement is
specified by predicate logic. In predicate logic, the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ consist of
a dependency relationship, for example, if the formula (∀w ∈ Weiche
FLSchutzbieten(w)) is fulfilled, it can also be deduced that (∃w ∈ Weiche
FLSchutzbieten(w)) is evaluated to be true1. If a system requirement is specified
with these two formulas at the same time, then the corresponding dependency must
also be correctly expressed. It has been mentioned above, if dependencies exist
between attributes of objects in a decision table, then system requirements must be
checked against the declared dependencies. The same concept can then be applied
to the dependencies between quantified attributes. Users specify the dependencies
in a decision table DTDependency (see Figure 6.4). The system requirements in
form of a decision table DTSR are then verified against DTDependency (e.g. DTSR |=
DTDependency). This can help to ensure the correctness of the specification w.r.t.
the dependency of quantified attributes.
Figure 6.4: An example of a dependency between quantified attributes
It should be noticed that system requirements in a form, like system require-
ment 3.3, rarely appear in interlocking system requirements specifications. There-
fore, the necessity of extending OBLH to support specification of system require-
ments in predicate logic shall be estimated before additional considerations in this
aspect are made.
In the current version of the OBLH tool, the function for defining the meaning
of each object’s attribute is not supported. This means, when a propositional
1|Weichen| > 0
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formula is transformed to a decision table, users need to type in the meaning of
each attribute manually. Therefore, the OBLH tool can be further improved by
providing such a function. Users define the meaning of each attribute once in the
tool. Rather than a proposition (e.g. BHSS), it will be indicated as the meaning
(e.g. the object is equipped with a movable frog or in German: Das Element ist mit
beweglicher Herzstu¨ckspitze ausgeru¨stet /BHSS) in the corresponding condition
stub in the decision table depending on the choice of users.
The last point that needs to be discussed is the novelty of the ideas of this
formal framework. Specifying system requirements in decision tables or in tabular
forms and checking completeness and consistency of decision tables has been ad-
dressed in a number of research projects [VD94b, HZ95, HL96, Kos06]. However,
they are different from OBLH in a number of aspects. Among these projects,
well-defined OBLH concepts like transformation of propositional logic, situational
analysis and checking correctness of system requirements with decision tables and
the corresponding implementation are not found. Secondly, decision tables or tab-
ular forms and the algorithms for implementation are not formally defined in some
of these projects. Therefore, the correctness of the implementations are difficult
to be analyzed, for example, in [Kos06], checking completeness and consistency of
decision tables has been discussed and implemented. However, decision tables and
algorithms of the implementation are not formally defined in this work. Without
a formal definition, well-defined mathematical packages, like the OBDD package
cannot be used. The correctness of the checking results cannot be guaranteed.
In some of these projects, workbenches are developed for specifying the system
requirements. However, they are not as user-friendly as the OBLH tool, for ex-
ample, in Prologa (Procedural Logic Analyzer) [VD94b, Van91, Van08], instead
of specifying system requirements directly in a decision table, decision rules need
to be typed in the tool. They are then transformed and represented in decision
tables.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this work, a part of concepts of German interlocking systems was first intro-
duced and the properties of their specifications were discussed. It was stated in
Section 2.3 that these specifications are written in German. Requirements are
outlined by complex railway terms and concepts. Furthermore, similar and even
identical system requirements are formalized by different statements in different
positions within the specifications. As a result, some system requirements are diffi-
cult to be interpreted. There is also a high chance to misinterpret the same system
requirement by different professions in the system development teams. Since the
system requirements are written in natural language, their correctness is difficult
to be checked. Inaccurate and wrong specifications affect the efficiency of system
developments and might cause errors in these systems. The later the discovery of
such mistakes is, the higher the costs of system developments are. An error in a
safety critical system, like RIS, might even cost human life.
In this work, applying formal methods in the early stage of an interlocking
system development is the proposed solution to handle these problems. The rea-
sons were discussed in detail in Section 3.1. The meaning of a formally specified
requirement becomes clear. The existence of errors in formal specifications can
also be checked by applying the corresponding mathematical concepts in the early
phases of system developments, such that no errors will be transferred to the next
phases of system developments. However, applications of formal methods have not
been widespread in the railway domain. As it was discussed in Section 3.2, the
main reason is the lack of participation and trust of railway engineers in apply-
ing formal methods. Therefore, the developed formal framework in this work is
engineering-oriented, such that different professions can also profit from the usage
of formal methods.
In chapter 4, the main concepts of OBLH and the OBLH tool were introduced.
With these engineering-oriented concepts and this implemented tool, different pro-
fessions of system development teams can specify, analyze and verify interlocking
system requirements formally. These system requirements can be classified based
on their nature and the defined categories in OBLH. Specifications become then
well-structured. Task assignment to each system development team and verifica-
tion of specifications becomes easy and efficient. The suitable formal specification
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language, propositional logic, is used to model an important part of interlocking
system requirements – the checking conditions that an RIS needs to consider dur-
ing the development of a safe route. These conditions are called static conditions in
OBLH. With the usage of propositional logic, the meaning of each static condition
becomes explicit and precise.
In this framework, users without a strong mathematical background, can also
understand the meaning of each formal requirement by using the function of trans-
formation. A propositional formula is transformed to a truth table and a decision
table. Its meaning is represented in these tables. The formal and clear system
requirements can then be understood easily and analyzed by different experts of
system development teams. When a complex requirement is expressed in the form
of a decision table, users can achieve the assessment of a situation w.r.t. interlock-
ing system requirements with the function called situational analysis in OBLH
(see Section 4.3.2). The analysis of a situation can be carried out quickly and
automatically in the OBLH tool.
Among the usage of a representation form of propositional formulas, decision
tables can also be used to specify static conditions in OBLH. These decision ta-
bles must be complete and their rules must be consistent among each other. In
order to facilitate specification of well-formed decision tables, concepts of checking
consistency and completeness w.r.t. the specified conditions of decision tables are
also developed and implemented in the OBLH tool (see Section 4.3.3).
One of the attractive benefits of applying formal methods is finding wrongly
specified requirements. Based on the discussed properties of interlocking system
requirements in Section 2.3, mathematics-based methods for specifying, analyzing
and verifying these requirements were defined in OBLH (see Section 4.3.4). In the
OBLH tool, the system requirements, expected behaviors and safety requirements
for verification and analysis are specified in decision tables. The corresponding
mathematical operations of each method are then carried out automatically in the
OBLH tool. As a result, railway engineers can also easily analyze and verify the
system requirements in this framework.
In a formal framework, every component should be explicitly stated. The
concepts and methods of OBLH were therefore mathematically defined by propo-
sitional logic in Chapter 5. In this chapter, propositional logic, decision tables
and the OBDDs technique were formally introduced. Their relationships and ap-
plications in OBLH were also discussed. The OBLH tool was implemented based
on these formal concepts. With these concepts, the implementation can be easily
achieved and understood. The correctness of their results can also be guaranteed.
With the current defined concepts of OBLH and the implemented OBLH tool,
different professions can already state and examine the interlocking system re-
quirements formally, although a number of aspects of this formal framework can
be further improved (see Chapter 6). This framework was successfully applied to
specify and check the correctness of a part of an interlocking requirement speci-
fication in an industrial project [HGS09]. In this project, these natural language
written system requirements are specified in propositional logic and transformed
to decision tables in the OBLH tool. It was shown that system requirements can
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be clearly stated and well-understood in both propositional formulas and deci-
sion tables. Railway engineers and computer scientists can analyze the formal
requirements without any difficulty. No misinterpretation of specifications can be
caused. Furthermore, unclear specifications were discovered and discussed. The
correctness of these system requirements is then increased after the application of
OBLH. OBLH can also be used in a different way. Instead of writing interlocking
system requirements in a natural language, requirements specifiers, like railway
engineers, can specify interlocking system requirements in decision tables directly
and these decision tables can be analyzed and verified in the OBLH tool. In this
way, specifiers can also benefit from the mentioned and demonstrated advantages
of the industrial project.
To summarize, the formal framework OBLH successfully brings the advantages
of utilization of formal methods to each member of interlocking system develop-
ment teams. More importantly, railway engineers are supported to play an impor-
tant role in using this formal framework. By applying this framework in the early
stage of the system development process, the specifications become precise and
consistent. As it was stated in different chapters of this work, the whole develop-
ment process becomes then efficient and cost-effective and the number of errors in
the system becomes less.
Appendix A
List of Symbols
Logic
Symbol Symbol Meaning
∵ because
¬φ not φ (logical negation)
φ ∧ ψ φ and ψ (logical and)
φ ∨ ψ φ or ψ (logical or)
φ→ ψ if φ is true, then ψ must be true (logical implication)
φ ≡ ψ φ and ψ are logically equivalent (logical equivalence)
φ |= ψ ψ is the logical consequence of φ semantically
φ ` ψ ψ is the logical consequence of φ syntactically
∀ for all
∃ there exists
Set theory
Symbol Symbol Meaning
{x1, x2, ..., xn} a set consisting of the elements x1, x2, ..., xn, n is
the number of elements of the set
|X| the number of elements in the set X
x ∈ X x is an element of the set X
X ⊆ Y X is a subset of Y
X\Y all elements from X that are not in Y
x 6= y the elements x and y are not the same
{Y, N}∗ all possible sequences composed of the elements Y and N
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Backus Naur Form (BNF)
Symbol Symbol Meaning
Exp := Rule1 the well-formed expression Exp can be composed
by applying expression rule Rule1
Rule1|Rule2 a well-formed expression of a language can be formed
by applying expression rules Rule1 or Rule2
Exp1 ⇒ Exp2 the expression Exp1 is transformed into
the expression Exp2 by applying one of the expression
rules given in BNF
Logical symbols from the OBLH tool1
Symbol Symbol Meaning
∼ φ not φ (logical negation)
φ & ψ φ and ψ (logical and)
φ | ψ φ or ψ (logical or)
φ => ψ if φ is true, then ψ must be true (logical implication)
1The propositional connectives ∧, ∨, ¬ and → are represented as &, |, ∼ and => in the
OBLH tool, respectively, because these propositioanl connectives are not found in the computer
keyboard.
Appendix B
List of Abbreviations
Abbrevation Abbrevation Meaning
BDDs Binary Decision Diagrams
CENELEC Comite´ Europe´en de Normalisation Electrotechnique
CSP Communicating Sequential Processes
CTL Computation Tree Logic
DNF Disjunctive Normal Form
DWeg Durchrutschweg
F False
FL Flankenschutz
Fu¨MBli Fahrstraßenfestlegeu¨berwachungsmelder Blinklicht
Fu¨MR Fahrstraßenfestlegeu¨berwachungsmelder Ruhelicht
Fu¨M Fahrstraßenfestlegeu¨berwachungsmelder
FW Fahrweg
GFM Gleisfreimeldeeinrichtung
GUI Graphical User Interface
iff If and only if
Ks Kombinationssignal
LH-ESTW-R Lastenheft fu¨ das Elektronische Stellwerk Regional
LTL Linear Time Logic
N No
OBDDs Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
OBLH Object-Based Lastenheft
RBDDs Reduced Binary Decision Diagrams
RIS Railway Interlocking System
RSL Rigorous Approach to Industrial Software Engineering
Specification Language
Prologa Procedural Logic Analyzer
SAT Satisfiability Solver
SMV Statistical Model Validation
T true
UMBP Pru¨fung der Umstellbedingungen
UML Unified Modeling Language
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Abbrevation Abbrevation Meaning
VDM Vienna Development Method
wff well formed formulas
w.r.t. with respect to
Y Yes
Z Z notation
ZPZ Zulassungspru¨fung Zugstraße
Zs Zusatzsignal
Appendix C
Railway Terms
This appendix lists German railways terms and the corresponding possible English
translation [Wor08, Pac08].
German English
Anzeige der Graphical User Interface(GUI)
Fahrdienstleiterarbeitsoberfla¨che of the RIS
Ausfahrstraße Safe exit route
Bahnhof Home signals limits
Beansprucht locked or reserved
Befahrbarkeitssperre A track section blocked for
train movements
Bewegliche Herzstu¨ckspitze Movable frog
Freie Strecke Open line
Deutsche Bahn German Rail
Durchfahrstraße Non-stop route
Durchrutschweg/DWeg Overlap
D-Weg-Ziel Overlap destination
Einfahrstraße safe entrance route
Fahrdienstleiter train director
Fahrstraße Safe route
Fahrstraßenlogik Interlocking logic
Fahrweg Route
Fahrwegelement Route element
Fiktiver Zielpunkt Virtual route destination’s point
Flankenschutz Flank protection
Flankenschutzelement Flank protection element
Gegenfahrausschluss Locking of conflicting routes
from the opposite direction
GFM-Abschnitt Track section
Gleis Track
Grundsatz Basic condition
Infrastrukturelement Infrastructure element
Kreuzung Crossing
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German English
Lage The position of the point
Rangierstraße Shunting route
Reservieren Reserved
Nicht grenzzeichenfrei isolierte Point with fouling track
circuit
Weiche Point
Schnittstelle Bahnhof/Strecke(Bf/Str) Interface Bf/Str
Sicherheitsregeln Safety requirements
Spitz befahren Facing point movement
Start Start
Stammgleis Straight track
Stellwerk Railway interlocking system
Stellwerkslogik Interlocking system logic
Streckenblockabschnitt Block section
Streckenblock Automatic block system
Stumpf befahren Trailing point movement
U¨berlappende D-Wege Overlapping overlaps
Umstellsperre Manually locking points
Umstellbedingung Condition for moving points
Verschließen Lock
ZPZ-Bedingungen ZPZ conditions
ZPZ-Bedingungen je Fahrwegelement ZPZ conditions for an
im Durchrutschweg infrastructure object located
within the overlap
ZPZ-Bedingungen je Fahrwegelement ZPZ conditions for an
im Fahrweg infrastructure object located
within the route
ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die gesamte ZPZ conditions for a safe route
Zugfahrstraße
ZPZ positiv ZPZ positive
Zugfahrstraße/ safe route
Zugstraße
Ziel Route destination
Zweiggleis Diverging track
Appendix D
Summary of Objects’ Attributes
Alle FLSchutzbieten: All points located in the track section can provide flank protection.
Alle Weichen in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt ko¨nnen Flankenschutz bieten.
BHSS: The object is equipped with a movable frog.
Das Element ist mit beweglicher Herzstu¨ckspitze ausgeru¨stet.
Bsp: The object is blocked for train movements.
Eine Befahrbarkeitssperre ist gesetzt.
EL(Durchfahrt): The locking or reservation belongs to a part of the requested non-stop safe route.
Nutzung geho¨rt zu einem Teil der einzustellenden Durchfahrt.
DWEL(b) The object is locked or reserved as an overlap element of other routes.
Das Element ist als DWeg-Element (DW≥0) fu¨r eine oder mehrere Zugstraßen
beansprucht.
DWEL(v): The object is locked as an overlap element of other routes.
Das Element ist als DWeg-Element (DW≥0) fu¨r eine oder mehrere Zugstraßen ver-
schlossen.
Eins FLSchutzeinnehmen: There exists at least one point located in the connected track section
is in the flank protective position.
Mindestens eine Weiche in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt nimmt die Flanken-
schutzlage ein.
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EL(v): The object is locked as a route, an overlap or a flank protection element of other
routes.
Als Fahrwegelement, DWeg-Element oder Flankenschutzelement fu¨r eine andere
Zugstraße verschlossen.
FLEL(b) The object is locked or reserved as a flank protection element of other routes.
Das Element ist als Flankenschutzelement fu¨r eine oder mehrere Fahrstraßen
beansprucht.
FLSchutzbieten(w): The point located in the connected track section can provide flank protection.
Das Element in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt kann Flankenschutz bieten.
FLSchutzeinnehmen(w) The point located in the connected track section is in the flank protective position.
Das Element in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt nimmt die Flankenschutzlage
ein.
Frei: The object of the requested safe route is free.
Das fu¨r die Fahrstraße beno¨tigte Element ist frei.
FreiGFM : The track section which is connected to a track section exposing the fouling point
is free.
Der am nicht grenzzeichenfrei isolierten Schenkel anschließende GFM-Abschnitt ist
frei.
FLSchutzbieten(w): The point located in the connected track section can provide flank protection.
Die Weiche in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt kann Flankenschutz bieten.
FLSchutzeinnehmen(w): The point located in the connected track section is in the flank protective position.
Die Weiche in dem anschließenden GFM-Abschnitt nimmt die Flankenschutzlage
ein.
FWEL(b): The object is locked or reserved as a route element of other routes.
Das Element ist als Fahrwegelement fu¨r eine andere Fahrstraße beansprucht.
KS1: The object indicates Ks1.
Das Element zeigt Ks1 an.
KS2: The object indicates Ks2.
Das Element zeigt Ks2 an.
Usp: The object is a manually locking point.
Das Element ist gegen Umstellen gesperrt.
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Solllage: The object is in the proper position for the requested safe route.
Das Element liegt in der Solllage fu¨r die einzustellende Zugstraße.
Spitz: The requested overlap of the safe route is a facing point movement.
Der einzustellende DWeg la¨uft u¨ber eine spitz zur Durchrutschrichtung liegende
Weiche.
Zs3: The object indicates Zs3.
Das Element zeigt Zs3 an.
ZPZDweg: The evaluation ZPZ conditions of the requested overlap is positive.
ZPZ des einzustellenden DWeg ist positiv.
ZPZDwegElement: The evaluation ZPZ conditions of the requested overlap is positive (based on the
ZPZ conditions in the view of an object).
ZPZ des einzustellenden DWeg ist positiv (nach den ZPZ-Bedingungen auf der Ebene
”Fahrwegelement im Durchrutschweg”).
ZPZDwegGesamtzugstraße: The evaluation ZPZ conditions of the requested overlap is positive (based on the
ZPZ conditions in the view of a safe route).
ZPZ des einzustellenden DWeg ist positiv (nach den ZPZ-Bedingungen fu¨r die Ebene
”gesamte Zugfahrstraße”).
Appendix E
OBLH User Guide
This appendix provides a guide for using the functions of the OBLH tool.
E.1 Starting the OBLH Tool
1. Double click the icon OBLH.
2. A workspace called Object-Based Lastenheft pops up in the desktop (see
Figure E.1).
Figure E.1: The OBLH tool and start icon
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E.2 Transformation of Formulas
In the OBLH tool, a formula can be transformed into different forms for analysis.
Users can transform this formula into a truth table, a Disjunctive Normal Form
(DNF) and a decision table. The theoretic background of the transformation was
discussed in Section5.5.
E.2.1 Logical Connectives in the OBLH Tool
The OBLH tool provides a set of logical connectives to users to specify propo-
sitional formulas1. The logical connectives and the corresponding symbols are
written as follows:
• Logical negation ∼
• Logical and &
• Logical or |
• Logical implication =>
If the input formula is not a well-formed formula, then a message box Warning
pops up (see Figure E.2). It indicates the errors.
E.2.2 Formulas to Truth Tables
1. Type in the formula into the combobox in the panel Formula.
2. Click the button Truth table in the panel Setting.
3. Click the button Load.
4. The result is shown in the text area in the panel Output (see Figure E.3).
E.2.3 Formulas to DNF
1. Type in the formula into the combobox in the panel Formula.
2. Click the button DNF in the panel Setting.
3. Click the button Load.
4. The result is shown in the text area in the panel Output (see Figure E.4).
1The propositional connectives ∧, ∨, ¬ and → are represented as &, |, ∼ and => in the
OBLH tool, respectively, because these propositioanl connectives are not found in the computer
keyboard.
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Figure E.2: An error message of non-wff
E.2.4 Formulas to Decision Tables
1. Type in the formula into the combobox in the panel Formula.
2. Click the button Decision Table (DT) in the panel Setting.
3. Click the button Load.
4. A window DT pops up. The name of the decision table is given based on
the number of generated decision tables. For example, the first generated
decision table is called DT1, while the second one is DT2 (see Figure E.5).
E.3 Specification in Decision Tables
The window of the decision table (see Figure E.6) can be adjusted into different
sizes. This can be achieved by stretching the corner of the window or using the
icons minimize or maximize. They are located at the right-hand corner of the
window. Furthermore, the size of the panel Condition and action can be changed
by shifting the split bar.
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Figure E.3: The generated truth table
E.3.1 Create Decision Tables
1. Click the items File>New>Decision Table in the menu bar.
2. A window DT pops up.
E.3.2 Open Decision Tables
1. Click the items File>Open>Decision Table (CVS) in the menu bar.
2. Choose the file in the file window and click the button Open.
3. A window DT pops up.
E.3.3 Manipulation in Decision Tables
The functions that are provided to manipulate decision tables are written as fol-
lows:
• Add actions or conditions: Click the items Action>Add Action or Action>Add
Condition in the menu bar.
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Figure E.4: The generated DNF
• Create rules: Click the items Action>Create Rule in the menu bar.
• Delete actions or conditions: Click the Action or Condition in the decision
table that is needed to be deleted. Click the items Action>Add Delete Ac-
tion/Condition in the menu bar.
• Delete rules: Click the items Action>Delete Rule in the menu bar. Type in
the assigned number of the rule that is needed to be deleted in the pop-up
message box. For example, deleting the rule R5, 5 is typed into the message
box.
• Save decision tables: Click the items Data>Store. Type in the file name in
the file window and click Save.
• Print decision tables: Click the items Data>Print.
• Close decision tables: Click the items Data>Close and save the decision
table if it is needed. Or click the icon Cross that is located at the right-hand
corner of the decision table window.
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Figure E.5: The generated decision table
Figure E.6: The window of a decision table
E.4 Analysis of Specifications
The OBLH tool provides different ways to analyze a specification. First, the con-
sistency of the user’s input decision tables can be checked. Furthermore, missing
rules of a decision table can be found out by checking its completeness. Finally,
when a definition of the domain specific concept has been specified as a formula
or a decision table, a situation can be evaluated based on the definition.
E.4.1 Checking Consistency of Decision Tables
1. Create and specify the decision table.
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2. Click the name of the decision table in the list of decision tables that is
located in the right-hand side of the panel Output.
3. Click the items Analysis>CheckDTConsistency in the menu bar. An error
message window pops-up if there exists an empty field in the decision table.
4. A message box pops-up to indicate the consistency of rules of the decision
table.
5. If an inconsistency is found in the decision table, an error message box pops-
up and the contradicted rule(s) will be automatically generated in the deci-
sion table. Users need to specify the value of its(their) action(s) (in figure
E.7).
E.4.2 Checking Completeness of Decision Tables
1. Create and specify the decision table (see Figure E.8).
2. Click the name of the decision table in the list of decision tables that is
located in the right-hand side of the panel Output.
3. Click the items Analysis>CheckDTCompleteness in the menu bar. An error
message window pops-up if there exists an empty field or inconsistency in
the decision table.
4. A message box pops-up to indicate the completeness of the decision table.
5. If the decision table is not complete, an error message box pops-up and the
missing rule(s) will be automatically generated in the decision table. Users
need to specify the value of its(their) action (see Figure E.9).
E.4.3 Situational Analysis
A situation fulfills a system requirement or the system requirements if its combi-
nation of conditions is evaluated to positive based on the definition.
1. The decision table of the definition must be first generated (e.g.DTDefinition).
See section E.2.4 and E.3.12.
2. To specify the situation, click the name of the decision table DTDefinition
in the list of decision tables.
3. Click the items Analysis>SpecifySituation. A window pops-up. This decision
table (e.g.DTSituation) consists of all the conditions of the definition that
are required to describe the situation (see Figure E.10).
4. Click the button Situation in the panel Setting.
2Whenever the data in the decision table has been amended, click the grey bar properly before
further analysis is performed.
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Figure E.7: The result of checking inconsistency
5. Type in the name of the decision table DTSituation into the left input box
of the panel Situation (e.g.before the word fulfills)
6. Type the name of the decision table DTDefinition in the right input box of
the panel Situation (e.g.after the word fulfills).
7. Click the button Check.
8. A message box pops-up to indicate the validity of the situation.
9. If the situation is invalid, a decision table is generated. In this decision table,
rules with action N indicate rules of DTDefinition that the situation does not
satisfy (see Figure E.11).
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Figure E.8: Checking completeness
E.5 Logical Consequence of Formulas
This logical consequence of two formulas φ |= ψ can be checked in the OBLH Tool
as follows:
1. The decision tables of these two formulas φ and ψ must be first generated 3.
2. Click the button Verification.
3. Type in the name of the decision table of φ (e.g.DTφ) in the left input box
of the panel Verification (see Figure E.12).
3Whenever the data in the decision table has been amended, click the grey bar properly before
further analysis is performed.
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Figure E.9: The result of checking completeness
4. Type in the name of the decision table of ψ (e.g.DTψ) in the right input box
of the panel Verification.
5. Click the button Check.
6. If ψ is a logical consequence of φ, a message box DTφ implies DTφ pops-up.
A decision table is generated. It is composed of a single rule with action Y.
7. If ψ is not a logical consequence of φ, a message box DTφ NOT implies DTφ
pops-up. A decision table is generated. In this decision table, rules with
action N indicate rules of DTφ that are not logical consequents to DTψ. In
other words, these rules have action Y in DTφ, while they have action N in
DTψ (see Figure E.13).
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Figure E.10: Specifying a situation
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Figure E.11: The result of situational analysis
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Figure E.12: The verification Panel
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Figure E.13: The result of verification
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